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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
-vs-
LAURA DABLE 
Defendant/Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Priority No. 2 
Case No. 20020096 CA 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Defendant entered a conditional plea of guilty on the 4th day of October, 2001 
and the oral order of Judgement and Sentence was imposed and entered in the trial court 
on the 13th day of December, 2001 and the Commitment, Judgement and Order was 
signed and filed by the Court on the 10th day of January, 2002. A Notice of Appeal was 
filed by the Defendant on the 13th day of December, 2001.(See Appendix A) A second 
Notice of Appeal was filed within 30 days of the filing of written judgement of the Court. 
The appeal is from a criminal judgement pursuant to the provisions of Rule 26 of the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and Utah Code Ann. 77-18a-L (1953 as amended). 
Jurisdiction of this court is invoked pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Ann. 78-2a-
3(e), (1953 as amended). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES TO BE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
I. Whether the Defendant adequately preserved the issues presented on appeal in 
light of Defendant's guilty plea 
1 
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II. Whether the district court erred in determining that the search warrant affidavit 
sufficiently established probable cause pursuant to the requirements of the United States 
Constitution and specifically the 4th and 14th Amendments thereto rendering the issuance 
of a search warrant based on the claimed deficiencies unlawful as follows:: 
A. The Affidavit in support of the search warrant failed to establish 
reasonable grounds to believe that contraband or evidence of a crime would be located at 
Defendant's residence. 
B. The affidavit failed to establish the veracity, reliability and basis of 
knowledge with respect to each of the informants in the affidavit. 
C. There was no attempt to justify the execution of a No-Knock, Night 
Search. 
III. The Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule has no application to the 
questioned search. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard of review when this Court reviews issues of law on appeal is that 
of correctness of the trial court's interpretation of Utah Law. 
DETERMINATIVE LAWS 
The determinative laws applicable to this case are the following: 
RULES CITED 
Rule 26, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
2 
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Rule 1 l(i), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
STATUTES CITED 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(e) (1953 as amended). 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5(l) (1953 as amended). 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a-l (1953 as amended). 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-205 (1953 as amended). 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-201 (1953 as amended). 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(e) (1953 as amended). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
United States Constitution. Amendment IV 
United States Constitution Amendment XIV 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS: 
1. This appeal is from a final judgment and sentence orally imposed and entered 
in the First District Court for Rich County, State of Utah on the 13th day of December, 
2001 and from the written order entered on the 10th day of January, 2002 convicting 
the Defendant of the offenses of Illegal Possession/Use of Controlled Substance 
(amended) - (3rd Degree Felony) and Illegal Possession/Use of Controlled 
Substance(amended) - (Class B Misdemeanor). 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS: 
1. A Search Warrant issued on the 7th day of June, 2000 by a Justice of the Peace 
3 
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sitting as a Magistrate in Rich County Utah was executed on that same evening. 
2. Based on items seized pursuant to the said Search Warrant the 
Defendant was ultimately accused of crimes committed in Rich County State 
of Utah as follows: 
COUNT 1: POSSESSION OR USE OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE 
IN A DRUG FREE ZONE in violation of Utah Code Annotated s58-37-8(2)(a)(a a 
second degree felony, as follows: That on or about June 7, 2000, in Rich County, the 
defendant did knowingly and intentionally possess or use a controlled substance; to wit 
Methamphetamine [II substance], and committed the offense: (ix) within 1,000 feet of 
any structure, facility, or grounds included in subsection (i) through (viii); to wit school 
zone. 
COUNT 2: POSSESSION OR USE OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE 
IN A DRUG FREE ZONE in violation of Utah Code Annotated S58-37-8(2)(e). a class A 
Misdemeanor, as follows: That on or about June 7, 2000, in Rich County, the defendant 
did knowingly and intentionally possess or use less than one ounce of marijuana, a 
Schedule I controlled substance, and committed the offense:(ix) within 1,000 feet of any 
structure, facility, or grounds included in subsection (i) through (viii), to wit school zone. 
COUNT 3: POSSESSION OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIA IN A DRUG 
FREE ZONE in violation of Utah Code Annotated §58-37a-5n\ a class A Misdemeanor, 
as follows: That on or about June 7, 2000, in Rich County, the defendant did knowingly, 
intentionally or recklessly use, or possess with intent to use, drug paraphernalia to plant, 
4 
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propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture, compound, convert, produce, process, 
prepare, test analyze, pack, repack, store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale, or 
otherwise introduce controlled substance into the human body. Furthermore, the 
defendant committed the offense: (ix) within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or 
grounds included in subsection(i) through (viii); to wit school zone. 
3. The Defendant was arraigned and a Preliminary Hearing was thereafter held on 
the 6th day of February, 2001, whereupon Defendant was bound over to stand trial. 
4. The Defendant, after arraignment in District Court, filed a Motion to 
Suppress Evidence and as grounds the Defendant alleged that the facts recited 
in the affidavit and presented to the Magistrate in support of the warrant were 
insufficient to permit the Magistrate to make a finding of 'Probable Cause'. The 
motion, supported by a Memorandum In Support of Motion to Suppress Evidence (see 
Appendix B) addressed the other issues presented by this appeal as well. 
5. A Hearing on Defendant's motion was had on the 1st day of May, 2001 and the 
court by oral Order denied said motion in its entirety, said Order was reduced to writing 
and filed in the District Court on the 26th day of June, 2001.(See Appendix C) 
6. Defendant did, on the 4th day of October, 2001, enter a conditional plea of 
guilty reserving the issues presented here for appeal; the court accepted said plea as 
conditional and pursuant to the stipulation of the parties stayed imposition of sentence 
pending this appeaUSee Appendix D) 
5 
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C. DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT: 
7. The Defendant filed an Application for a Certificate of Probable Cause (See 
Appendix E) which application was approved after acceptance of the conditional plea 
of guilty and sentence. The Conditional Plea reserved issues for appeal as follows: 
A. The validity of the Search Warrant 
B. The adequacy of the underlying affidavits 
C. The question of whether the Search Warrant was issued on probable 
cause 
D. Certain other irregularities and inadequacies noted in the pleadings. 
8. The Court required that a pre-sentence be prepared and submitted prior to 
imposition of sentence. The court then reviewed the pre-sentence report and considered 
the recommendations therein and sentenced the Defendant to an indeterminate term not to 
exceed five years in the Utah State Prison, which sentence was suspended in favor of 
Probation. Defendant was required on Charge 1 to serve a term of 30 days and on Charge 
2 a term of 180 day(s), in jail, the total time suspended for charge 2 was 180 day(s) the 
Defendant was also sentenced to pay fines totaling $1400.00, plus interest, to attend 
alcohol and/or drug counseling and to adhere to standard conditions of probation. 
Defendant's Motion for a Certificate of Probable Cause was granted and the imposition 
of the probationary sentence was stayed pending this appeal. 
D. STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS: 
9. The Defendant was, on or about June 7, 2000, subjected to a Category 2 stop 
6 
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while driving her motor vehicle in Lincoln County, within the State of Wyoming. The 
stop was effected by Wyoming officers after those officers purported to obtain 
information from an unnamed person alleged to be confidential informant (that informant 
actually, confessed to being an accomplice of Defendant) that the Defendant was about to 
enter Wyoming from Utah with the purpose to consummate a methamphetamine sale at 
the informant's residence; the confidential informant is further alleged to have advised 
the Wyoming Police that the Defendant's Utah drivers license was suspended. Based 
on that information and upon suspicion of speeding Wyoming officers executed the 
Category 2 stop of Defendant's vehicle.. The Wyoming officers confiscated what was 
alleged to be methamphetamine and thereupon arrested Defendant.1 
10. Defendant's residence in the rural town of Randolph, Rich County, Utah, 
is geographically adjacent to the Wyoming County where Defendant was arrested. 
Wyoming authorities notified the Rich County, Utah Sheriffs Office of the arrest and 
relayed to the Utah officers the facts that the confidential informant had reported to them 
that Defendant planned on procuring drugs in Ogden, Utah and thereafter transporting the 
drugs to sell in Lincoln County, Wyoming for sale. Wyoming officers also relayed the 
information that what they supposed to be marijuana and methamphetamine had been 
confiscated from Defendant's vehicle. 
11. According to the Wyoming officers, Defendant had, during the Wyoming 
1
 The Defendant was convicted in Wyoming as a result of the roadside search and 
received a probationary sentence. 
7 
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stop, confessed that she had procured the confiscated drugs in Ogden, Utah and had 
stopped at her residence in Randolph, Utah for several hours before her arrest in 
Wyoming. 
12. Based on the information relayed by the Wyoming officers, the Utah officers 
sought to obtain a search warrant of Defendant's residence from a local magistrate. By 
way of Affidavit in an effort to support probable cause, a Utah officer sought to bolster 
the Wyoming information with the added information that another informant had reported 
to the Utah officers in April, more than two months previously, that an informant had 
bought methamphetamine from Defendant at her residence. (The affiant neglected to 
advise the magistrate that the April informant was being held in jail, accused of a crime, 
at the time the information was obtained.) The Utah officers, according to the affidavit, 
did not indicate that they had made any effort to substantiate this prior accusation and 
there was no reports of any active investigation of Defendant in process at the time that 
the search warrant was requested.2 
13. Utah officers obtained and executed a No-Knock, Nighttime Search warrant 
of Defendant's residence. When the Utah officers arrived at Defendant's residence, it 
was unoccupied. The Utah officers commenced their search at 18:32 hours and remained 
until 22:32 hours. Sundown on the day of execution, 7th of June, 2002, was at 8:59 (See 
Appendix J ) o'clock p.m. Based on the evidence of controlled substances discovered in 
2This lack of follow-up investigation finds support in the officers notes of the 
incident found in the Appendix. 
8 
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the search, criminal charges were filed. 
14. The Defendant's Motion to Suppress the fruits of the search warrant was 
ultimately denied by the District Court and a conviction resulted, that conviction being as 
a result of a negotiation whereby Defendant entered pleas to the following charges as 
amended: 
Count 1: A Third Degree Felony of possession or use of a controlled 
schedule two substance, methamphetamine 
Count 2: A Class B Misdemeanor, possession or use of a schedule 
one controlled substance, less than one ounce of marijuana (See Appendix D) 
15. Defendant entered a plea of Guilty on the 4th day of October , 2001 
reserving the right to appeal from the court's order denying Defendant's Motion To 
Suppress the Evidence seized from Defendant's home pursuant to the search warrant 
contested here. 
16. The Court having received and considered a Pre-Sentence report imposed 
judgment and sentence on the 13th day of December, 2001, whereby the Defendant was 
sentenced, pursuant to that conviction, to serve not more than five years in the Utah State 
Penitentiary. That sentence was stayed in favor of probation and the Defendant was 
ordered placed on probation with Adult Parole and Probation under specified terms and 
conditions including the specific requirement that Defendant serve 30 days in the Rich 
County Jail without work release and pay a fine in the amount of $800.00, which fine 
included the statutory surcharge. Defendant was further required to enroll in and 
9 
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complete counseling through Bear River Alcohol and Drug and to pay all fees assessed 
in connection therewith. In addition to the specified terms the Defendant was to conform 
to standard conditions of probation. The Class B Misdemeanor was sentenced to be 
served concurrently. The court stayed imposition of the sentences pending appeal. (See 
Appendix E) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
17. The issues were adequately preserved for appeal by the Defendant 
filing a Motion to Suppress Evidence, and upon denial thereof, entering a conditional 
plea prior to trial. 
18. That the trial court in this case erred in denying Defendant's Motion to 
Suppress Evidence is apparent upon review of the actions of the issuing magistrate. The 
affidavits and information submitted for the issuance of the search warrant failed to 
assert sufficient probable cause supporting any contention that contraband or evidence of 
a crime would be found in Defendant's residence. The affidavits contained nothing more 
than "bare bones' allegations obtained from a confidential informant without any basis 
for imputing reliability or trustworthiness to those allegations. 
19. The Utah officers uncritically accepted the information provided by the 
Wyoming officers without verification and made no attempt to corroborate the 
information provided by the Wyoming officers nor did those officers attempt to verify 
that the allegation made by the Utah informant months prior to Appellant's Wyoming 
arrest was reliable. Nothing presented to the magistrate corroborated the report made by 
10 
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the Wyoming officer or the representation of the Utah informant that Defendant was 
selling methamphetamine from her residence. 
20. Given the fact that these were cbare bones' allegations, this information is 
excluded from the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule as enunciated by the 
U.S. Supreme Court as a part of the 4th Amendment jurisprudence propounded by that 
Court. 
21. The warrant was facially defective in that the mandate of the statute was 
violated and no justification was provided therein which would provide support for the 
issuance or execution of the No-Knock, Night Search execution of the search warrant. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
WHETHER THE DEFENDANT/APPELLANT, IN CONNECTION WITH 
THE PLEA OF GUILTY, ADEQUATELY RESERVED THE ISSUES 
NOW ON APPEAL 
22. The Application for Certificate of Probable Cause,(See Appendix F) filed 
with the Court on the 13th day of December, 2001 at the time of Sentencing and as 
accepted by the court is established by the Transcript of the proceeding had on the 4th day 
of October, 2001. At page 7, the Defendant "...[pleaded] guilty conditionally to the 
charges 
on which she is to be sentenced", and thereby reserved her right to appeal. In State v. 
Sery, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), the Utah Court of Appeals held that conditional 
pleas are permissible in Utah even in the absence of any statute or rule authorizing them. 
11 
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The Court approved the Sery holding by adopting a rule permitting conditional pleas, 
provided that the Defendant reserves in the record the right, on appeal from the 
judgment, to a review of the adverse determination of any specified pre-trial motion and 
further providing that a defendant who prevails on appeal shall be allowed to withdraw 
the guilty plea; Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 1!(/). 
23. The Defendant contends that the issues on appeal were adequately preserved 
by entry of a conditional plea and the same appearing on the record. 
POINT II 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT THE SEARCH 
WARRANT AFFIDAVIT SUFFICIENTLY ESTABLISHED PROBABLE 
CAUSE FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A SEARCH WARRANT 
24. The protection for citizens of the United States against unlawful search and 
seizures requires that the judgement of an impartial and detached judicial officer be 
interposed between the police, hot in pursuit of their appointed target, and the citizen. 
The judicial officer must judge and "not serve merely as a rubber-stamp for the police" 
See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897(1984). The magistrates judgment must be based 
upon judicially reliable facts adequate to demonstrate that the search is justified by the 
probability that it will yield the fruits or instrumentalities of crime. A search 
warrants must be supported by probable cause sufficient to satisfy the mandates of the 
Fourth Amendment. When the police used an unknown, unproven informant with little 
or no corroboration to justify the search of a suspect's home it was held in United States 
v. Wilhelm, 80 F.3d 116,121 ( 4th Cir. 52. 1996)citing Pavton v. New York. 445 U.S. 573, 
12 
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585 (1980) that such an affidavit falls short of providing probable cause. The Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution3 provides the right of privacy in one's 
home, " is a most important interest protected by the Fourth Amendment and a 
continuing theme in constitutional jurisprudence" Pay ton v. New York( Supra). In 
determining whether probable cause is sufficient for the issuance of a search warrant, the 
magistrate "is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the 
circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the 'veracity' and 'basis of 
knowledge' of persons supplying the hearsay information, there is a fair probability that 
contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place." U.S.v. Tuten 240 
F.3d 1292 (10th Cir 2001) citing Illinois v. Gates. 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 76 
L.Ed 2d 527(1983). 
25. In reviewing the probable cause determination of the District Court, the 
standard is whether, "under the totality of the circumstances presented in the affidavit, the 
magistrate had a 'substantial basis' for such a determination." GatesfSupra) at 238-39. 
Such a review is not conducted de novo State v. Potter, 860 P.2d 952,956 (Utah App. 
1993Vciting State v.Collard 810 P.2d 884, 885(Utah App), cert. Denied, 817 P.2d 
327(Utah 1991)) and the affidavit is to be considered exclusive to that end and must be 
considered "in its entirety." State v. PotteriSupra) at page 954.(citing State v. Anderson, 
3
 The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
13 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
701 P.2d 1099, 1102(Utah 1985). 
26. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that in reviewing a warrant, the 
considerations of the informant's veracity, reliability and basis of knowledge are 
significant factors in the probable cause determination. However, it was said, "a 
deficiency in one may be compensated for, in determining the overall reliability of a tip, 
by a strong showing as to the other, or by some other indicia of reliability." Illinois v. 
Gates (Supra) at page 213 (1983). 
27. In the case at bar, the search warrant affidavit fails in that the allegations 
therein are insufficient to establish any of the necessary elements preliminary to a 
determination of probable cause. First, Defendant contends that the affidavit lacks a 
coherent nexus between the perceived evidence in Wyoming of wrongdoing and the 
existing conditions at Defendant's residence, which nexus would establish a fair 
probability that contraband or evidence of a crime would be found there. Second, the 
affidavit failed to provide any indicia of veracity or reliability, or to disclose a rational 
basis of knowledge by the informants. Third, the affidavit failed because it was so 
incomplete as to violate the statute in Utah Code Annotated 77-23-205(1), and provided 
no basis for a No-Knock, Night Search warrant, which warrant is essentially what the 
Utah officer executed without that justification. 
A. The affidavit failed to establish reasonable grounds to 
Believe that contraband or evidence of a crime would be found 
at Defendant's residence. 
28. The affidavit in the case at bar did not provide the magistrate with any rational 
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basis for drawing a reasonable inference that a search of Defendant's residence would 
disclose evidence of criminal activity. "Probable cause undoubtedly requires a nexus 
between suspected criminal activity and the place to be searched." U.S. v. Danhauer, 229 
F.3d 1002,1006 (10th Cir. 2000) (citing U. S. v. Coral-Corral 899 F.2d 927,937 (10th Cir. 
1990). 
29. At the time of Defendant's arrest in Lincoln County, Wyoming Defendant had 
not been convicted of any crime and had, only at that moment, become a subject of an 
investigation by the Utah Police. Assuming, without admitting, the fact that Defendant 
was under investigation, that fact, standing alone provided no nexus that would further an 
indication that contraband or evidence of criminal activity might be located in her 
residence. State v. Potteri Supra) at pg. 956 (See State v. Brooks. 849 P.2d 640,644(Utah 
App.)(holding that information that defendant had been a target of investigations by local 
drug agencies during the past several years does nothing to indicate that controlled 
substances will currently be found at his residence). No exigent circumstances intervened 
in that Defendant was incarcerated and held incommunicado at the time of the execution 
of the search warrant and there was no reason expressed to the point that Defendant or 
that any agent of Defendant might destroy, carry away or tamper with any evidence 
located at her residence. 
30. Defendant's residence in Randolph was referred to only twice in the affidavit 
of Officer Stacey, once in reference to an allegation by an informant that he had twice 
bought drugs from Defendant's trailer months previously; and once by reference to a 
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statement attributed to Defendant by Wyoming police officers that Defendant had 
stopped at her residence before continuing to Wyoming. Interestingly, information 
known to the officer at the time he made his affidavit directly contradicted the purported 
confession of Defendant.4 Neither reference either by itself or as taken together provided 
sufficient evidence for any reasonable belief that contraband or evidence of criminal 
activity would be found at Defendant's residence. 
31. The Court in U.S. v. Danhauer illustrated a similar deficiency in the search 
warrant affidavit. In that case, the police received a tip from a confidential informant 
that the accused were cooking methamphetamine in the garage of the residence. The 
detective on the case attempted to corroborate the tip by reviewing the criminal records 
of the accused, by verifying the physical address and ownership of the residence, and by 
observing activity occurring in the vicinity of the home. U.S. v. Danhauer, (Supra) at 
page 1002,1004. The detective noted, as corroboration in his affidavit, facts that a 
criminal background check revealed that one of the suspects had tested positive for 
methamphetamine and opiates in a recent urine analysis. Id. The reviewing Court ruled 
that despite the efforts of the detective: 
'The detective made little attempt to link methamphetamine to the Danhauer residence. 
...The only possible nexus between Danhauer's residence and the alleged criminal 
activity was his wife's urinalysis result. This is not the type of evidence that enables the 
state magistrate to draw a reasonable inference that the items subject to the search 
4
 In Officer Stacey's report dated 6/14/00, he relates, "On June 6, Officer Clark 
asked me if our officers could watch for Dable We did not see Dable in Randolph that 
evening." (See Appendix H) 
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warrant would be located at Danhauer's residence. Such a nebulous connection does not 
give a magistrate a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed." Id. at 
1006. 
32. Important similarities as well as important differences exist between the 
Danhauer affidavit and the affidavit in the case at bar. One of the significant differences 
is that the detective in Danhauer made some attempt to corroborate an otherwise 
unverifiable informant tip with an independent investigation, the evidence of which he 
included in the affidavit. The officer in the case at bar made no such attempts either after 
receiving the remote tip about drug sales from Defendant's residence or after the 
communication from Wyoming officers two months later. The tip received by the Utah 
officer in April was conclusory in nature, a naked averment of sale of drugs from 
Defendant's home; the tip didn't provide enough evidence to establish probable cause in 
April nor did it draw added strength as a result of the occurrence in June. Utah officers 
made no efforts to investigate immediately after they received the April tip and what 
amounted to inconsequential corroboration in June constituted, at best, a "nebulous 
connection" as disapproved in Danhauer. 
33. The remainder of the affidavit in the case at bar amounts to nothing more than 
inept and inappropriate attempts to make more "nebulous connections" between drug 
sales and the Defendant's home. The Utah officer made what appears to be transparent 
attempts to "cut and paste" irrelevant and uncorroborated statements together in an effort 
to establish probable cause. Utah officers attempted to use the information relayed from 
Wyoming officers taken from a Wyoming informant, but the only possibly relevant 
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information gained was the admission from Defendant that she had stopped at her home 
before her arrest. Because the Wyoming officers had confiscated the drugs Defendant 
admittedly bought in Ogden, Utah they being the same drugs described by the Wyoming 
informant as being under contract of delivery , there was no surviving reason to believe 
that the subject drugs were at Defendant's residence or that Defendant would ultimately 
be selling those drugs from her residence. The other allegations within the affidavit make 
no reference to Defendant's residence. 
34. The affidavit in the case at bar, not unlike the affidavit in Danhauer, 
inappropriately relies on statements without substance to persuade a magistrate to any 
reasonable inference that contraband or evidence of criminal activity would be disclosed 
upon a search of the Defendant's residence. 
B. The affidavit in support of the search warrant failed to 
establish the veracity, reliability and basis of knowledge for 
each of the informants in the affidavit. 
35. Of the several informants named in the affidavit, the affidavit failed to provide 
any veracity and/or reliability and/or the basis of knowledge for any one of those 
informants. In Unites States v. SturmoskL 971 F.2d 452,457 (10th Cir. 1992) the 
reviewing court said, "When there is sufficient independent corroboration of an 
informant's information, there is no need to establish the veracity of the informant." In 
the case at bar, there was no independent corroboration recited in the affidavit and 
therefore, the veracity and basis for knowledge of the informants is indispensable to the 
determination of probable cause based on the totality of the circumstances. Id. (citing 
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Illinois v. Gates (Supra) at page 213,238. Let us now discuss each of the informants 
separately. 
1. ThrellOrton 
36. The affidavit in the case at bar recites that "Threll Orton informed your 
affiant that he had bought methamphetamine from Laura Dable at the trailer described in 
this affidavit on at least two occasions." (See Appendix G). In addition to omission of 
the relative time frame, no corroborating evidence for this statement is recited in the 
affidavit. It is totally insupportable that within the affidavit no dates are supplied as to 
when the informant disclosed this information, or as to when the officer received this 
information, nor is any background supplied in the affidavit as to the circumstances 
under which the officer obtained the information. The affidavit reveals nothing about 
Threll Orton except his name and his uncorroborated allegation of buying drugs at 
Defendant's trailer. Interestingly, information known to the officer at the time he made 
his affidavit directly contradicts what was written in the affidavit, as related in the Deputy 
report dated 6/14/00, " Back in April, a man named Threll Orton ... He told me that he 
had gotten the Methamphetamine he sold from a woman in Randolph named Laura". 
(emphasis mine) (See Appendix H) 
37. In addition to the discrepancies noted above, the affidavit provides no 
indication that any informant has provided reliable information in the past. There is 
nothing to indicate that the informant was advised that a prosecution for providing false 
information might ensue or that the informant gave the information in a sworn 
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statement. A reasonable magistrate would have no basis for relying on a statement from 
an unknown person at an unknown date, without some factual explanation linking the 
remote statement to the affidavit provided to the magistrate two months later. Most 
importantly the magistrate was not advised that the informant was under arrest at the time 
of the disclosures. This was not the case where a disinterested citizen supplied the 
information. 
38. The affidavit reports that the Wyoming officers confiscated the drugs that 
Defendant admittedly bought in Ogden, Utah, hence the evidence at that point directly 
contradicted Threll Orton's April implication that Defendant ever sold drugs from her 
home. The circumstances of the confiscation of the drugs, if disclosed, would tend to 
rebut any implication of Defendant's sale of drugs from her home. The remote 
information given to Utah police by Threll Orton would have thereby been likely 
excluded from consideration with respect to the affidavit because after the drugs were 
confiscated, what was alleged by Orton was thereby contradicted and became suspect. 
State v. Potter (Supra) at page 952,957 (citing State v. Brown 798 P.2d 284,288 (Ut. App. 
1990). 
39. Threll Orton's statement is the only possible inference in the affidavit that 
tends to connect the residence of the Defendant with criminal activity and as such it 
required independent corroborative evidence or , in the alternative, indicia of informant's 
veracity and reliability. As seen in the affidavit, the statement imputed to Orton stands 
alone without any dates or circumstances clothing the provided information with 
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reliability and without clothing the informant with credibility.(See Appendix G ) Striking 
similarities exist between the affidavit in the case at bar and the affidavit in the previously 
analyzed Danhauer case. In Danhauer, the Court ruled that such information, without 
more, is insufficient, observing that: 
wThe affidavit contains repetitive statements regarding physical description of the 
Danhauer residence and the identity of the occupants. Further, the affidavit contains 
statements about the criminal histories of both Dennis and Robbi Danhauer. The 
affidavit does not reveal, however, the informant's basis of knowledge or adequately 
verify the informant's basis of knowledge or adequately verify the informant's most 
serious allegation, that the Danhauers were manufacturing methamphetamine. An 
affidavit replete with repetitive and tenuous facts does not provide the magistrate with a 
sufficient basis for drawing a reasonable inference that a search would uncover evidence 
of criminal activity.". U.S. v. Danhauer, (Supra) at 1002,1006. 
40. Appellant suggests that the affidavit in the case at bar is made entirely of 
"repetitive and tenuous facts" where the form affidavit allows space for evidence of the 
reliability of the informants, facts corroborating, or past reliable statements (See 
Appendix G ), the officer recites: 
"Threll Orton told your affiant that he was able to buy methamphetamine from Laura 
Dable, the person living in the described trailer. Dable was arrested in Lincoln County, 
Wyoming on 6/7/00 for possession of methamphetamine and marijuana." 
41. One is compelled to ask uso what'? The affidavit then provides a space in the 
probable cause section for facts of the case, how they were observed, the date at which 
they were observed and the date they were reported to affiant, the response: 
" Threll Orton informed your affiant that he had bought methamphetamine from 
Laura Dable at the trailer described in this affidavit on at least two occasions. 
On 6/7/00 I spoke with Deputies Kim Clark and Jody Gardner from the Lincoln 
County Sheriffs Office. They indicated that they were working on a drug case, and that 
a confidential informant told them that Laura Dable was planning on picking up some 
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drugs in Ogden on 6/6/00 and bring them into Lincoln County to sell. On 6/7/00, Dable 
was stopped and her vehicle searched. The officers located approximately 4 ounces of 
Marijuana and 4 grams of methamphetamine. 
Dable informed officers that she had bought the drugs in Ogden on 6/6/00 and had 
stopped at her residence in Randolph for several hours before going on up to Lincoln 
County. Your affiant feels there is probable cause to believe some of the drugs bought in 
Ogden were left in the trailer because there have allegedly been sales made from the 
trailer to people in this county."(See Appendix G) 
42. The bulk of the information in the probable cause section is not relevant to 
alleged criminal activity at Defendant's residence and the one insupportable statement 
attributed to Threll Orton, which is repeated a significant number of times without any 
corroborative evidence and without support for the implied veracity or reliability of the 
informant, is clearly insufficient to provide any reasonable basis for the belief that 
criminal activity might be ongoing at Defendant's home. 
43. Appellant submits that the last line of the affidavit modifies the entire 
narrative and causes the same to fall grossly short of probable cause standards. It is 
contended that what the affiant "feels" is irrelevant, and reference to alleged sales to 
people is unsurpassed in the annals of vagueness and nonspecificity. One may only 
conclude that the search of Defendant's residence was based on a "feeling" which relied 
on an unfounded report of nonspecific "sales" to unknown "people". Interestingly, the 
search result itself did not provide support for the informants contention as to sales but 
only tended to establish that personal drug use had occurred on the premises. The 
totality of the circumstances as recited in the subscribed to affidavit falls far short of 
establishing probable cause for the search of Defendant's residence and at best amounts 
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to a 'leap of faith" by the attesting officer. 
2. The Wyoming Informant 
44. The unnamed Wyoming informant, according to the affidavit, alleged that 
Defendant was planning on buying drugs in Ogden to sell in Lincoln County. Because 
this informant's statements are not relevant to the existence of probable cause to search 
Defendant's residence, the statements attributed to that confidential informant will not 
be addressed in detail. This Court should note, however, that the affidavit provided no 
amplifying information about the informant. Nothing in the affidavit demonstrated the 
reliability or veracity of the informant's disclosure. The information regarding the 
Wyoming informant was of the "bare bones" variety disapproved in United States v Leon 
(Supra) at 897. (See also U. S. v.Danhauer (Supra) "the affidavit contained bare-bones 
allegations obtained from a confidential informant" 
3. Wyoming Officers (Kim Clark and Jody Gardner) 
45. The information relayed by the Wyoming officers, largely heresay on heresay, 
had nothing to do with evidence of a crime at Defendant's residence. The information 
provided by the Wyoming officers established only that Defendant had been arrested 
pursuant to the Wyoming informant's tip and that the drugs that Defendant bought in 
Ogden had been confiscated. The admission by Defendant that she had stopped at her 
home before her arrest adds nothing of value to the Utah affidavit. The Wyoming 
officers did not relay any corroboration that would implicate Defendant's residence. The 
inclusion of their testimony in the affidavit was inappropriately relied upon as a basis for 
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probable cause, most importantly, those informant officers, within the affidavit, were not 
clothed with either veracity or reliability. 
46. In Spinelli v. United States. 393 U.S. 410(1969), the court stated, "The past 
reliability of the informant can no more furnish probable cause for believing his current 
report than can previous experience with the officer himself. Illinois v. Gatesf Supra) at 
Footnote 8, we compare Stanley v. State, 19 Md App., at 530, 313 A.2d, at 861, 
"reasoning that "[e]ven assuming 'credibility' amounting to sainthood, the judge 
[magistrate] still may not accept the bare conclusion... of a sworn and known and trusted 
police-affiant [informant]." The Trial Judge specifically held, at page 3 ^ 6 of the 
FINDINGS AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
EVIDENCE (See Appendix I ) that "Enforcement Officers even if said officer or officers 
were not known to the affiant need no other verification or other indicia of reliability and 
may be, taken as true by the magistrate simply because the informant was a Peace 
Officer." The District Court clearly errored in its specific holding. 
C. There was no justification for the execution of a No-Knock 
Night search warrant. 
47. The Night Search and No Knock sections within the affidavit form are left 
blank. In what appears to be the inexplicable rush to obtain the search warrant, both the 
magistrate and the affiant failed to even address these sections within the affidavit or 
within the search warrant. It was, therefore, nothing less than unconscionable that the 
Utah Officers entered Defendant's home unannounced and remained there until after 
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dark. As might be expected when the officers arrived, the trailer was unoccupied, the 
officer having knowledge that Defendant was, at that time, incarcerated in Wyoming. 
Utah officers began execution of the search warrant at approximately 6:32 pm and 
remained in Defendant's residence until approximately 10:16pm going through 
Defendant's personal items. The times as related to the search warrant execution are 
disputed by neither Appellant nor Appellee. 
D. The actions of the Utah Officers in the execution of the 
Warrant do not satisfy the Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary 
Rule. 
48. In the United States v. Leon (Supra), the Supreme Court of the United States 
held that evidence obtained by "officers reasonably relying on a warrant issued by a 
detached and neutral magistrate"(emphasis mine) is admissible. The Court pointed out 
that "officers" should be read broadly to include those who obtain the warrant as well as 
those who conduct the search and that the "officers" must act based upon an "objectively 
reasonable" reliance. The Court acknowledged," [that] in some circumstances the officer 
will have no reasonable ground for believing that the warrant was properly issued." Id. at 
922-23 & n. 24. In that footnote , the Court noted that an officer could not obtain a 
warrant on the basis of a "bare bones" affidavit and then rely on colleagues, who are 
ignorant of the circumstances under which the warrant was obtained, to conduct the 
search. 
49. In Leon, the Court noted that the judicially carved good-faith exceptions may 
not be applied in four situations: (1) If the magistrate is misled by information in the 
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affidavit that the affiant knew was false or would have known was false except for his 
reckless disregard for the truth. Id- At 923 (citing Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 57 
L.Ed.2d 677, 98 S Ct. 2674 (1978)); (2) If the issuing magistrate wholly abandoned his 
judicial role. Id. (citing Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 422 U.S. 319, 60 L.Ed.2d 920, 99 
S. Ct. 2319 (1979)); (3) If the affidavit does not provide the magistrate with a substantial 
basis for determining the existence of probable cause. Id. (citing Brown v. Illinois, 422 
U.S. 590 at 610-11, 45 L.Ed.2d. 416, 95 S. Ct. 2254 (1975)); (4) If the warrant is so 
facially deficient that the executing officers cannot reasonably presume it to be valid. Id. 
(See, Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 82 L.Ed.2d 737, 104 S. Ct. 3424 (1984)). 
50. Appellant contends that, in the case at bar, this Court should not, anymore 
than did the District Court; apply the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule 
because, with respect to the affidavit in question, all four situations noted in the Leon 
opinion come into play. The affiant, in reckless disregard for the truth failed to note the 
circumstances whereby he garnered disclosures from informants. In two instances both 
the Utah informant and the Wyoming Informant were under arrest during the time that 
the information was provided and could not be treated as disinterested citizens. 
51. In this case, it is patently apparent that the issuing magistrate did not act as 
anything other than a "rubber stamp" in approving the skeletal affidavit without change 
and this fact alone suggests that the magistrate acted in a manner not consistent with his 
role as a neutral and detached judicial officer. See United States v. Wilhelm, 80 F.3d 
116, 121 (4thCir. 52. 1996). 
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52. Appellant next contends that the "bare bones" nature of the affidavit is such 
that it is apparent that no magistrate reasonably within a judicial role could find a 
substantial basis for determining the existence of probable cause. Id. See also. United 
States v. Jackson. 818 F.2d. 345 (5th Cir. 1987) (the Court there found the affidavit to be 
"bare bones" and incapable of supporting a finding of probable cause); United States v. 
Barrington, 806 F.2d. 529 (5th Cir. 1987) was to the same effect. 
53. With significant portions of the "form affidavit" left incomplete the challenged 
warrant is defective on its face and no executing officer would therein find sufficient 
instruction upon which the warrant could be properly and conscientiously executed. Utah 
Code 77-23-205(1) provides: "The magistrate shall insert a direction in the warrant that it 
be served in the daytime, unless the affidavits or oral testimony state a reasonable cause 
to believe a search is necessary in the night to seize the property prior to it being 
concealed, destroyed, damaged, altered, or for other good reason; in which case he may 
insert a direction that it be served any time of the day or night..." Utah Code 77-23-
201(1) & (2) provides," (1) "Daytime" means the hours beginning at 6 a.m. and ending at 
10 p.m. local time. (2) "Search warrant" is an order issued by a magistrate in the name of 
the state and directed to a peace officer, describing with particularity the thing, place, or 
person to be searched and the property or evidence to be seized by him and brought 
before the magistrate." In reviewing the affidavit objectively, two undisputable facts 
exist (1) A good portion of the affidavit is left blank; and (2) The written comments 
amount to nothing more than a series of repetitive statements. The affidavit could only 
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be described as "facially deficient." The most detail in the affidavit is that of Defendant's 
trailer, which detail stand for nothing if the affiant fails to establish a connection between 
Defendant's trailer and evidence of wrongdoing. No information regarding the 
informants is provided nor is any independent corroboration of informant disclosures 
listed nor is attention given to the No Knock, Night Search strictures as applied by 
Utah Law evident within the body of the warrant. (See Appendix G ) 
54. From whatever the source, the information presented must be sufficient to 
allow the magistrate to independently determine probable cause: "his action cannot be a 
mere ratification for the bare conclusions of another. "Gates,(Supra at 239.) Likewise, a 
conscientious peace officer is left without sufficient guidance to execute the warrant that 
has come into his hands. Accordingly, given the information presented in the affidavit, 
and as apparent on the face of the warrant the facts of this case do not merit the 
application of the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. 
CONCLUSION 
The privacy and protection of hearth and home is a fundamental right. Even in the 
more rural parts of this nation, where "everybody knows everybody" and certain 
formalities, legal and otherwise, are oft-times overlooked; any application of a state 
officer to enter into a private residence must be rigorously scrutinized. Strict standards 
for the establishment of probable cause are in place for the protection of private 
residences , particularly from law enforcement with a "feeling" that evidence of 
wrongdoing will be found. These protections are in place regardless of whether or not 
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the "hunch" of law enforcement ultimately is supported by the fruits of the improvident 
search. 
Based upon the foregoing facts and argumeflftMDefendant Laura Dable respectfully 
requests this Court to reverse the order denying the motion to suppress the search of 
Dable's residence, and remand this to the trial courrfor withdrawal of Dable's guilty plea 
and for further proceeding not inconsistent with this\court\s opinion. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED on this pf pfeo 
to the Attorney for the Appellee at the address listed bel 
2003. 
Mark Shurtleff 
Attorney General, State of Utah 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
,2003 
I certify that I mailed two true and correct copies of the BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
s ^ d a y o f f^ ^3* , 
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ADDENDUM 
(None Required) 
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of53 UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE Rule 26 
•Jjulo 2G. Appeals. 
(1) An appeal is taken by filing with the clerk of the court from which the 
appeal is taken a notice of appeal, stating the order or judgment appealed 
from, and by serving a copy of it on the adverse party or his attorney of record, 
proof of service of the copy shall be filed with the court. 
(2) An appeal may be taken by the defendant from: 
(a) the final judgment of conviction, whether by verdict or plea; 
(b) an order made, after judgment, affecting the substantial rights of 
the defendant; 
(c) an interlocutory order when, upon petition for review, the appellate 
court decides that the appeal would be in the interest of justice; or 
(d) any order of the court judging the defendant by reason of a mental 
disease or defect incompetent to proceed further in a pending prosecution. 
(3) An appeal may be taken by the prosecution from: 
(a) a final judgment of dismissal; 
(b) an order arresting judgment; 
(c) an order terminating the prosecution because of a finding of double 
jeopardy or denial of a speedy trial; 
(d) a judgment of the court holding a statute or any part of it invalid; 
(e) an order of the court granting a pretrial motion to suppress evi-
dence when, upon a petition for review, the appellate court decides tha t 
the appeal would be in the interest of justice; or 
(f) an order of the court granting a motion to withdraw a plea of guilty 
or no contest. 
(1) (a) Ail appeals in criminal cases shall be taken within 30 days after the 
entry of the judgment appealed from, or, if a motion for a new trial or 
arrest of judgment is made, within 30 days after notice of the denial of the 
motion is given to the defendant or his counsel. Proof of giving notice 
shall be filed with the court. 
fb) An appeal may not be dismissed except for a material defect in 
taking it, or for failure to perfect the appeal, or upon motion of the appel-
lant. The dismissal of the appeal affirms the judgment unless another 
appeal may be, and is, timely taken. 
(5) Cases appealed in which the defendant is unable to post bond shall be 
given a preferred and expeditious setting in the appellate court. 
(6) Appeals may be submitted on briefs. If an appellant's brief is filed, the 
appeal shall be decided even though a party, upon notice of the hearing, fails 
to appear for oral argument. 
(7) The rules of civil procedure relating to appeals govern criminal appeals 
to the appellate court, except as otherwise provided. 
(8) (a) In appeals to the Supreme Court of capital cases where the sentence 
of death has been imposed, appellant briefs shall be filed within 60 days 
of the filing of the record on appeal. Respondent briefs shall be filed 
within 60 days of receipt of the appellant brief. All issues to be raised on 
appeal shall be included by each party in its appellate, brief. Appellant 
reply briefs shall be filed within 30 days of receipt of the respondent's 
brief. 
(b) One 30-day extension of the 60-day filing period may be granted to 
each party, but only upon application to the Supreme Court showing 
v.\t! a-.; unitary circuui.-Ljia.-s »•  aiiaviung an txUtii.sioii. 
(c) The Supreme Court shall schedule the oral arguments of the case to 
be heard not more than ten days after the date of filing of the final brief. 
Following oral arguments, the case shall be placed first on the Supreme 
Court's calendar, for expeditious determination. 
(9) After an initial appeal has been resolved, a subsequent appeal of a 
capital case where the sentence of death has been imposed may not be enter-
tained by any court, nor may a stay of execution of the sentence be granted, 
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Rule 26 UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
when the appeal does not raise any new matter not previously resolved or ^ 
when new matter could have been raised at the previous appeal. ":$M 
(10) In capital cases where the sentence of death has been imposed and th^i l 
defendant has chosen not to pursue his appeal, the case shall be automatical!^! 
reviewed by the Supreme Court within 60 days after certification by the?il 
sentencing court of the entire record, unless the time is extended by tV.J ' " 
Supreme Court for good cause. A case involving the sentence of death has 
priority over all other cases in setting for hearing and in disposition by the 
Supreme Court. 
(11) The rules of practice for the Court of Appeals and circuit courts made 
by the Judicial Council and approved by the Supreme Court relating to ap-
peals from circuit courts govern criminal as well as civil appeals. 
(12) An appeal may be taken to the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals. 
as is appropriate, from all final orders and judgments rendered in a district 
court or juvenile court under this rule. 
(13) An appeal may be taken to the circuit court from a judgment rendered 
in the justice court under this rule, except: 
(a) the case shall be tried anew in the circuit court. The decision of the 
circuit court is final, except when the validity or constitutionality of a 
statute or ordinance is raked ici the justice court; 
(b) within 20 days after receipt of the notice of appeal, the justice court 
shall transmit to the circuit court a certified copy of the docket, the origi-
nal pleadings, all notices, motions, and other papers filed in the case, and 
the notice and undertaking on appeal; 
(c) stay of execution and relief pending appeal are under Rule 27, Utah 
Rules of Court [Criminal! Procedure; or 
(d) all further proceedings are in the circuit court, including any pro-
cess required to enforce judgment. 
A m e n d m e n t Notes. — The 1989 amend-
ment, effective April 24, U»89, added "whether 
by verdict or plea" to the end of Subsection 
'2ifa); delated "or" from the end of Subsection 
iMHd), ;u]«ied t!cr!! to the end of Subsection 
01'to», and added Subsection (3)>0; substituted 
"may" for "can" in the second sentence of Sub-
section (4Kb); divided Subsections i6) and 
ii-i'-a) into two sentences by deleting "and"; 
divided Subsection (8) into Subsections (8)(a) 
through (8Kc); substituted ' 'made" tov ''promul-
gated" in Subsection (11); added "Utah Rules of 
Court Procedure; or" to the olid of Subsection 
(13hc»; and made minor stylistic changes 
throughout the rule. 
Compi le r ' s Notes. — This rule governs ap-
peals from district, circuit, and juvenile courts. 
The practice aud procedure for taking such ap-
peals, including tbe time in which the appeal is 
filed, are prescribed by the Utah Rules of Ap-
pe! 1 ate Pruccd tire. 
The reference in Subsection «';:}•(<-< io the 
"Utah Rules of Court Procedure" is apparently 
intended as a reference to the Rules of Crimi-
nal !Vtv:,'duro. 
Cross References. — Appeals r.o Court of 
Appeals, § 78-4-11. 
Appeals from justice's court to circuit court, 
§ 78-5-120. 
Appellate jurisdiction oi'disirici courts, IJtuh 
Const., An. VII!, Sec. 5; y 78-3-4. 
Appellate jurisdiction of Suptome Court, 
LHah Const., Art. v'lil, Sec. 3; § 7S-'J-2. 
Dismissal if affidavit <:f imeecuni'v 
untrue, § 21-7-7. 
Judicial Council. Utah Const., Ait. VI!l. Se«. 
12. 
Right of defendant to appeal, Utah COP:-! 
Art. I, See. 12; $ 77-1 e. 
Kight of indujeni accused to vo^i^-A o:: a;: 
peal, § 77-:)2-i el s^q. 
I:' 
NOTSS TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Appeal by defendant. 
Appeal by prosecution. 
--Dismissals. 
Appealability. 
Applicability of civil rules. 
— Court findings. 
Attorney's failure to file notice. 
I>;nd over orders. 
Death penalty cas^.•;. 
Double jeopardy. 
Habeas corpus ruling. 
jwfe 
Justice court. 
Notice of appeal. 
Oral -.ialeraenU from bene 
K.-veisni of order arresline 
Review of acquittal prohihi 
Revie.v of evidence. 
Time for appeal. 
Cited. 
Apnea! by defendant . 
A purported second judgrr 
which was clearly an attempt to •inb 
im»nt in criminal proceeding winch 
[merit and KOJ 
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Rule 11 UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 416 
(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if 
applicable, the minimum mandatory nature of the minimum sentence, that 
may be imposed for each offense to which a plea is entered, including the 
possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences; 
(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea 
agreement, and if so, what agreement has been reached; 
(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any motion to 
withdraw the plea; and 
(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal is limited. 
These findings may be based on questioning of the defendant on the record 
or, if used, a sworn statement reciting these factors after the court has 
established that the defendant has read, understood, and acknowledged the 
contents of the sworn statement. If the defendant cannot understand the 
English language, it will be sufficient that the sworn statement has been read 
or translated to the defendant. 
Unless specifically required by statute or rule, a court is not required to 
inquire into or advise concerning any collateral consequences of a plea. 
(f) Failure to advise the defendant of the time limits for filing any motion to 
withdraw a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill is not a ground 
for setting the plea aside, but may be the ground for extending the time to 
make a motion under Section 77-13-6. 
(g)(1) If it appears that the prosecuting attorney or any other party has 
agreed to request or recommend the acceptance of a plea to a lesser included 
offense, or the dismissal of other charges, the agreement shall be approved by 
the court. 
(2) If sentencing recommendations are allowed by the court, the court shall 
advise the defendant personally that any recommendation as to sentence is not 
binding on the court. 
(h)(1) The judge shall not participate in plea discussions prior to any plea 
agreement being made by the prosecuting attorney. 
(2) When a tentative plea agreement has been reached, the judge, upon 
request of the parties, may permit the disclosure of the tentative agreement 
and the reasons for it, in advance of the time for tender of the plea. The judge 
may then indicate to the prosecuting attorney and defense counsel whether the 
proposed disposition will be approved. 
(3) If the judge then decides that final disposition should not be in confor-
mity with the plea agreement, the judge shall advise the defendant and then 
call upon the defendant to either affirm or withdraw the plea. 
(i) With approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution, a 
defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, or no 
contest, reserving in the record the right, on appeal from the judgment, to. a 
review of the adverse determination of any specified pre-trial motion. A 
defendant who prevails on appeal shall be allowed to withdraw the plea. 
(j) When a defendant tenders a plea of guilty and mentally ill, in addition to 
the other requirements of this rule, the court shall hold a hearing within a i 
reasonable time to determine if the defendant is mentally ill in accordance *i 
with Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-103. j 
(Amended effective May 1, 1993; January 1, 1996; November 1, 1997; Noveny j 
ber 1,2001.) 1 
Advisory Committee Note. — These 
amendments are intended to reflect current law 
without any substantive changes. The addition 
of a requirement for a finding of a factual basis 
in section (eX4)(B) tracks federal rule 11(f), and 
is in accordance with prior case law. E.g. State 
v. Breckenridge, 688 R2d 440 (Utah 1983). The 
rule now explicitly recognizes pleas under 
North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 
160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970), and sets forth the 
factual basis required for those pleas. E.g' I 
Wdlett v. Barnes, 842 P.2d 860 (Utah 1992). 
The amendments explicitly recognize that J 
plea affidavits, where used, may properly be | 
incorporated into the record when the trial 1 
court determines that the defendant has read j 
(or been read) the affidavit, understands its j 
contents, and acknowledges the contents. State A 
v. Maguire, 830 R2d 216 (Utah 1991). Proper I 
incorporation of plea affidavits can save the | 
1 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
UTAH CRIMINAL CODE 
58-37-8 (2)(a)(i) 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
\ 
OCCUPATIONS AND PROFESSIONS 58-37-8 
b * (c) Any person who has been convicted of a violation of 
^"Subsection (lXaXii) or (iii) may be sentenced to imprison-
ment for an indeterminate term as provided by law, but if 
'- the trier of fact finds a firearm as defined in Section 
*"• 76-10-501 was used, carried, or possessed on his person or 
in his immediate possession during the commission or in 
: furtherance of the offense, the court shall additionally 
sentence the person convicted for a term of one year to run 
I consecutively and not concurrently; and the court may 
r additionally sentence the person convicted for an indeter-
' minate term not to exceed five years to run consecutively 
and not concurrently. 
#K (d) Any person convicted of violating Subsection 
*; (iXaXiv) is guilty of a first degree felony punishable by 
'imprisonment for an indeterminate term of not less than 
t- seven years and which may be for life. Imposition or 
' execution of the sentence may not be suspended, and the 
& person is not eligible for probation. 
(2) Prohibited acts B — Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful: 
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to 
• possess or use a controlled substance, unless it was 
tt obtained under a valid prescription or order, directly 
*ta from a practitioner while acting in the course of his 
\y professional practice, or as otherwise authorized by 
Pr"'• this chapter; 
£* " (ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in 
\ t;" control of any building, room, tenement, vehicle, boat, 
Pf' aircraft, or other place knowingly and intentionally to 
permit them to be occupied by persons unlawfully 
!*• possessing, using, or distributing controlled sub-
W stances in any of those locations; or 
£* (iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to 
f^*" possess an altered or forged prescription or written 
|£ order for a controlled substance. 
W' (b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection 
j*(2XaXi) with respect to: 
(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more, 
0 j is guilty of a second degree felony; 
, (ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, mari-
Jn)? juana, if the amount is more than 16 ounces, but less 
g|. than 100 pounds, or a controlled substance analog, is 
guilty of a third degree felony; or 
|g.. (iii) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in the form 
i)> of an extracted resin from any part of the plant, and 
|v9*. the amount is more than one ounce but less than 16 
gts•> ounces, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
Ejjj (c) Any person convicted of violating Subsection 
p(2XaXi) while inside the exterior boundaries of property 
Mceupied by any correctional facility as defined in Section 
||64«13-1 or any public jail or other place of confinement 
lahallbe sentenced to a penalty one degree greater than 
provided in Subsection (2)(b). 
MMd) Upon a second or subsequent conviction of posses-
Won of any controlled substance by a person, that person 
g ™ H he sentenced to a one degree greater penalty than 
Mmded in this Subsection (2). 
Pjfe) Any person who violates Subsection (2Xa)(i) with 
fffcpect to all other controlled substances not included in 
gabeection (2XbXi), (ii), or (iii), including less than one 
KJjnice of marijuana, is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
•Won a second conviction the person is guilty of a class A 
PMBdemeanor, and upon a third or subsequent conviction 
E&e person is guilty of a third degree felony. 
ifcjv ^ ^ person convicted of violating Subsection 
ffi/feXii) or (2)(a)(iii) is: 
E*< (i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misde-
m meanor; 
(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor; and 
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a 
third degree felony. 
(3) Prohibited acts C — Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and inten-
tionally: 
(i) to use in the course of the manufacture or 
distribution of a controlled substance a license num-
ber which is fictitious, revoked, suspended, or issued 
to another person or, for the purpose of obtaining a 
controlled substance, to assume the title of, or repre-
sent himself to be, a manufacturer, wholesaler, apoth-
ecary, physician, dentist, veterinarian, or other au-
thorized person; 
(ii) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or 
attempt to procure the administration of, to obtain a 
prescription for, to prescribe or dispense to any per-
son known to be attempting to acquire or obtain 
possession of, or to procure the administration of any 
controlled substance by misrepresentation or failure 
by the person to disclose his receiving any controlled 
substance from another source, fraud, forgery, decep-
tion, subterfuge, alteration of a prescription or writ-
ten order for a controlled substance, or the use of a 
false name or address; 
(iii) to make any false or forged prescription or 
written order for a controlled substance, or to utter 
the same, or to alter any prescription or written order 
issued or written under the terms of this chapter; or 
(iv) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die, 
plate, stone, or other thing designed to print, imprint, 
or reproduce the trademark, trade name, or other 
identifying mark, imprint, or device of another or any 
likeness of any of the foregoing upon any drug or 
container or labeling so as to render any drug a 
counterfeit controlled substance. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (3Xa) 
is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(4) Prohibited acts D — Penalties: 
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a 
person not authorized under this chapter who commits 
any act declared to be unlawful under this section, Title 
58, Chapter 37a, Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act, or under 
Title 58, Chapter 37b, Imitation Controlled Substances 
Act, is upon conviction subject to the penalties and 
classifications under Subsection (4)(b) if the act is com-
mitted: 
(i) in a public or private elementary or secondary 
school or on the grounds of any of those schools; 
(ii) in a public or private vocational school or 
postsecondary institution or on the grounds of any of 
those schools or institutions; 
(iii) in those portions of any building, park, sta-
dium, or other structure or grounds which are, at the 
time of the act, being used for an activity sponsored 
by or through a school or institution under Subsec-
tions (4)(aXi) and (ii); 
(iv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care 
facility; 
(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or 
recreation center; 
(vi) in a church or synagogue; 
(vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium, 
arena, theater, movie house, playhouse, or parking lot 
or structure adjacent thereto; 
(viii) in a public parking lot or structure; 
(ix) within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or 
grounds included in Subsections (4)(a)(i) through 
(viii); or 
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OCCUPATIONS AND PROFESSIONS 58-37-8 
Jpq-r (c) Any person who has been convicted of a violation of 
Subsection (lXaXii) or (iii) may be sentenced to imprison-
ment for an indeterminate term as provided by law, but if 
Jjp the trier of fact finds a firearm as defined in Section 
76-10-501 was used, carried, or possessed on his person or 
¥ in his immediate possession during the commission or in 
W furtherance of the offense, the court shall additionally 
I sentence the person convicted for a term of one year to run 
p consecutively and not concurrently; and the court may 
jtf* additionally sentence the person convicted for an indeter-
r* minate term not to exceed five years to run consecutively 
jti and not concurrently. 
fo&- (d) Any person convicted of violating Subsection 
gft (IXaXiv) is guilty of a first degree felony punishable by 
fe- imprisonment for an indeterminate term of not less than 
seven years and which may be for life. Imposition or 
execution of the sentence may not be suspended, and the 
person is not eligible for probation. 
(2) Prohibited acts B — Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful: 
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to 
possess or use a controlled substance, unless it was 
obtained under a valid prescription or order, directly 
from a practitioner while acting in the course of his 
professional practice, or as otherwise authorized by 
this chapter; 
(ii) for any owner, tenant , licensee, or person in 
control of any building, room, tenement, vehicle, boat, 
aircraft, or other place knowingly and intentionally to 
permit them to be occupied by persons unlawfully 
possessing, using, or distributing controlled sub-
stances in any of those locations; or 
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to 
possess an altered or forged prescription or written 
order for a controlled substance. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection 
F * (2XaXi) with respect to: 
(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more, 
is guilty of a second degree felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, mari-
juana, if the amount is more than 16 ounces, but less 
than 100 pounds, or a controlled substance analog, is 
guilty of a third degree felony; or 
(iii) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in the form 
of an extracted resin from any part of the plant, and 
the amount is more than one ounce but less than 16 
ounces, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
jj< (c) Any person convicted of violating Subsection 
•$(2XaXi) while inside the exterior boundaries of property 
•Occupied by any correctional facility as defined in Section 
K64-13-1 or any public jail or other place of confinement 
p t h a l l be sentenced to a penalty one degree greater than 
provided in Subsection (2)(b). 
P (d) Upon a second or subsequent conviction of posses-
ton of any controlled substance by a person, tha t person 
*«*U be sentenced to a one degree greater penalty than 
[^Provided ^
 t n i s Subsection (2). 
(•) Any person who violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) with 
R ™ P e c t to all other controlled substances not included in 
Jjjjrtfcection (2Xb)(i), (ii), or (iii), including less than one 
SJjjnce of marijuana, is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
jVpon a second conviction the person is guilty of a class A 
W8demeanor, and upon a third or subsequent conviction 
^ P e r s o n is guilty of a third degree felony. 
M) Any person convicted of violating Subsection 
or (2)(a)(iii) is: 
(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misde-
meanor; 
(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor; and 
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a 
third degree felony. 
(3) Prohibited acts C — Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and inten-
tionally: 
(i) to use in the course of the manufacture or 
distribution of a controlled substance a license num-
ber which is fictitious, revoked, suspended, or issued 
to another person or, for the purpose of obtaining a 
controlled substance, to assume the title of, or repre-
sent himself to be, a manufacturer, wholesaler, apoth-
ecary, physician, dentist, veterinarian, or other au-
thorized person; 
(ii) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or 
attempt to procure the administration of, to obtain a 
prescription for, to prescribe or dispense to any per-
son known to be attempting to acquire or obtain 
possession of, or to procure the administration of any 
controlled substance by misrepresentation or failure 
by the person to disclose his receiving any controlled 
substance from another source, fraud, forgery, decep-
tion, subterfuge, alteration of a prescription or writ-
ten order for a controlled substance, or the use of a 
false name or address; 
(iii) to make any false or forged prescription or 
written order for a controlled substance, or to utter 
the same, or to alter any prescription or written order 
issued or written under the terms of this chapter; or 
(iv) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die, 
plate, stone, or other thing designed to print, imprint, 
or reproduce the trademark, trade name, or other 
identifying mark, imprint, or device of another or any 
likeness of any of the foregoing upon any drug or 
container or labeling so as to render any drug a 
counterfeit controlled substance. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (3)(a) 
is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(4) Prohibited acts D — Penalties: 
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a 
person not authorized under this chapter who commits 
any act declared to be unlawful under this section, Title 
58, Chapter 37a, Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act, or under 
Title 58, Chapter 37b, Imitation Controlled Substances 
Act, is upon conviction subject to the penalties and 
classifications under Subsection (4)(b) if the act is com-
mitted: 
(i) in a public or private elementary or secondary 
school or on the grounds of any of those schools; 
(ii) in a public or private vocational school or 
postsecondary institution or on the grounds of any of 
those schools or institutions; 
(iii) in those portions of any building, park, sta-
dium, or other structure or grounds which are, at the 
time of the act, being used for an activity sponsored 
by or through a school or institution under Subsec-
tions (4)(a)(i) and (ii); 
(iv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care 
facility; 
(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or 
recreation center; 
(vi) in a church or synagogue; 
(vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium, 
arena, theater, movie house, playhouse, or parking lot 
or structure adjacent thereto; 
(viii) in a public parking lot or structure; 
(ix) within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or 
grounds included in Subsections (4)(a)(i) through 
(viii); or 
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77-18-17. Retroactive application. 
The provisions of Sections 77-18-9 through 77-18-17 apply 
retroactively to all arrests and convictions regardless of the 
date on which the arrests were made or convictions were 
entered. 1994 
CHAPTER 18a 
THE A P P E A L 
Section 
77-18a-l . 
77-18a-2. 
Appeals — When proper. 
Capital cases. 
77-18a- l . A p p e a l s — When proper. 
(1) An appeal may be taken by the defendant from: 
(a) the final judgment of conviction, whether by verdict 
or plea; 
(b) an order made after judgment that affects the 
substantial rights of the defendant; 
(c) an interlocutory order when upon petition for re-
view the appellate court decides the appeal would be in 
the interest of justice; or 
(d) any order of the court judging the defendant by 
reason of a mental disease or defect incompetent to 
proceed further in a pending prosecution. 
(2) An appeal may be taken by the prosecution from: 
(a) a final judgment of dismissal, including a dismissal 
of a felony information following a refusal to bind the 
defendant over for trial; 
(b) an order arresting judgment; 
(c) an order terminating the prosecution because of a 
finding of double jeopardy or denial of a speedy trial; 
(d) a judgment of the court holding a statute or any 
part of it invalid; 
(e) an order of the court granting a pretrial motion to 
suppress evidence when upon a petition for review the 
appellate court decides that the appeal would be in the 
interest of justice; 
(f) under circumstances not amounting to a final order 
under subsection (2)(a), a refusal to bind the defendant 
over for trial on a felony as charged or a pretrial order 
dismissing or quashing in part a felony information, when 
upon a petition for review the appellate court decides that 
the appeal would be in the interest of justice; or 
(g) an order of the court granting a motion to withdraw 
a plea of guilty or no contest. 1997 
77-18a-2. Capital cases. 
After the resolution of an initial appeal of a capital case 
when the sentence of death has been imposed, a subsequent 
appeal may not be entertained by any court and a stay of 
execution of the sentence may not be granted when the appeal 
does not raise any new matter not previously resolved or when 
the new matter could have been raised at the previous appeal. 
1990 
CHAPTER 19 
THE EXECUTION 
Judgment for fine or costs — Enforcement. 
Judgment of imprisonment — Commitment. 
Special release from city or county jail — Pur-
poses. 
Special release from city or county jail — Condi-
tions and limitations. 
Special release from city or county jail — Revo-
cation. 
Section 
77-19-1. 
77-19-2. 
77-19-3. 
77-19-4. 
77-19-5. 
Section 
77-19-6. 
77-19-7. 
77-19-8. 
77-19-9. 
77-19-10. 
77-19-11. 
77-19-12. 
77-19-13. 
Judgment of death — Warrant — Delivery 
warrant — Determination of execution time' 
Judgment of death — Statement to Board oil 
Pardons and Parole. 
Judgment of death, when suspended, and W 
whom. 
Judgment of death not executed — Order for 
execution. 
Judgment of death — Location and procedure! 
for execution. 
Who may be present — Photographic and record* 
ing equipment. 
Return upon death warrant. 
Incompetency or pregnancy of person sentenced 
to death — Procedures. 
4 
77-19-1. Judgment for fine or costs — Enforcement 
If the judgment is for a fine or costs when allowed by statute 
and the fine is not paid as ordered by the court, execution or 
garnishment may be issued as on a judgment in a civil action. 
The prosecuting attorney, upon written request of the court 
clerk, shall effectuate collection through execution or garnish* 
ment when the fine or costs have not been paid as ordered by 
the court. iset 
77-19-2. Judgment of imprisonment — Commitment 4 
If the judgment is for imprisonment, the sheriff of the • 
county or other appropriate custodial officer designated by the 
court shall, upon receipt of a certified copy of the judgment, 
deliver the defendant to the warden of the state prison or 
keeper of the jail. Such custodial officer shall also deliver a 
certified copy of the judgment and take a receipt from the 
warden or keeper of the jail for the defendant and return it to 
the court. 1980 
77-19-3. Special release from city or county jail — 
Purposes. 
Any person sentenced to a term in any city or county jail 
may, pursuant to order of the sentencing judge, be released 
from jail during those hours which are reasonable and neces-
sary to accomplish any of the following purposes: ' 
(1) Working at his employment; 
(2) Performing essential household duties; 
(3) Attending an educational institution; 
(4) Obtaining necessary medical treatment; or 
(5) Any other proper purpose the court may order. 
I960 
77-19-4. Special release from city or county jail — 
Conditions and limitations. 
All released prisoners, while absent from the jail, are in the 
custody of the jailer and subject at any time to being returned 
to jail, if good cause appears for so doing. The judge shall 
specify the terms and conditions of the release time which may 
include, but are not limited to the following: 
(1) The prisoner may be required to pay all monies 
earned from employment during the jail term to those 
persons he is legally responsible to support; or 
(2) He may be required to pay a reasonable amount for 
the expenses of his maintenance in the jail but may be 
permitted to retain sufficient money to pay his costs of 
transportation, meals, and other incidental and necessary 
expenses. * 
During all hours when the prisoner is not serving the 
function for which he is awarded release time, he shall be 
confined to jail. The prisoner shall be responsible for obtaining 
his own transportation to and from the place where he 
performs the function for which he is released. 198* 
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of fingerprints for the purpose of conducting a national crimi-
nal history background check. 
(2) Fingerprints of applicants for admission to the Utah 
State Bar shall be submitted to the Department of Public 
Safety, Bureau of Criminal Identification to be used to conduct 
a criminal history background check and to the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation to obtain a national criminal history 
background check. 
(3) The criminal history background information obtained 
from the Department of Public Safety and the national crimi-
nal history background information obtained from the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation pursuant to this section may be used 
by the Utah State Bar to determine an applicant's character, 
fitness, and suitability for admission to the Utah State Bar. 
2001 
78-2-5. Repealed . 1988 
78-2-6. Appel late court administrator. 
The appellate court administrator shall appoint clerks and 
support staff as necessary for the operation of the Supreme 
Court and the Court of Appeals. The duties of the clerks and 
support staff shall be established by the appellate court 
administrator, and powers established by rule of the Supreme 
Court. 1986 
78-2-7. Repealed. 1986 
78-2-7.5. Service of sheriff to court. 
The court may at any time require the attendance and 
services of any sheriff in the state. 1988 
78-2-8 to 78-2-14. Repealed. 1986,1988 
CHAPTER 2a 
COURT OF APPEALS 
Section 
78-2a-l. Creation — Seal. 
78-2a-2. Number of judges — Terms — Functions — 
Filing fees. 
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
78-2a-4. Review of actions by Supreme Court. 
78-2a-5. Location of Court of Appeals. 
78-2a-6. Appellate Mediation Office — Protected records 
and information — Governmental immunity. 
78-2a-l . Creation — Seal. 
There is created a court known as the Court of Appeals. The 
Court of Appeals is a court of record and shall have a seal. 
1986 
78-2a-2. Number of judges — Terms — Functions — 
Filing fees. 
(1) The Court of Appeals consists of seven judges. The term 
of appointment to office as a judge of the Court of Appeals is 
until the first general election held more than three years 
after the effective date of the appointment. Thereafter, the 
term of office of a judge of the Court of Appeals is six years and 
commences on the first Monday in January, next following the 
date of election. A judge whose term expires may serve, upon 
request of the Judicial Council, until a successor is appointed 
and qualified. The presiding judge of the Court of Appeals 
shall receive as additional compensation $1,000 per annum or 
fraction thereof for the period served. 
(2) The Court of Appeals shall sit and render judgment in 
panels of three judges. Assignment to panels shall be by 
random rotation of all judges of the Court of Appeals. The 
Court of Appeals by rule shall provide for the selection of a 
chair for each panel. The Court of Appeals may not sit en banc. 
(3) The judges of the Court of Appeals shall elect a presid-
ing judge from among the members of the court by majority 
vote of all judges. The term of office of the presiding judge is 
two years and until a successor is elected. A presiding judge of 
the Court of Appeals may serve in that office no more than two 
successive terms. The Court of Appeals may by rule provide for 
an acting presiding judge to serve in the absence or incapacity 
of the presiding judge. 
(4) The presiding judge may be removed from the office of 
presiding judge by majority vote of all judges of the Court of 
Appeals. In addition to the duties of a judge of the Court of 
Appeals, the presiding judge shall: 
(a) administer the rotation and scheduling of panels; 
(b) act as liaison with the Supreme Court; 
(c) call and preside over the meetings of the Court of 
Appeals; and 
(d) carry out duties prescribed by the Supreme Court 
and the Judicial Council. 
(5) Filing fees for the Court of Appeals are the same as for 
the Supreme Court. 1988 
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdict ion. 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all ex-
traordinary writs and to issue all writs and process necessary: 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and de-
crees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, includ-
ing jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal 
adjudicative proceedings of state agencies or appeals from 
the district court review of informal adjudicative proceed-
ings of the agencies, except the Public Service Commis-
sion, State Tax Commission, School and Institutional 
Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of Forestry, Fire 
and State Lands actions reviewed by the executive direc-
tor of the Department of Natural Resources, Board of Oil, 
Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer; 
(b) appeals from the district court review of: 
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political 
subdivisions of the state or other local agencies; and 
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 
63-46a-12.1; 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in 
criminal cases, except those involving a charge of a first 
degree or capital felony; 
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, 
except those involving a conviction or charge of a first 
degree felony or capital felony; 
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary 
writs sought by persons who are incarcerated or serving 
any other criminal sentence, except petitions constituting 
a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence for a first 
degree or capital felony; 
(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordi-
nary writs challenging the decisions of the Board of 
Pardons and Parole except in cases involving a first 
degree or capital felony; 
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic rela-
tions cases, including, but not limited to, divorce, annul-
ment, property division, child custody, support, parent-
time, visitation, adoption, and paternity; 
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and 
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the 
Supreme Court. 
(3) line Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by 
the vote of four judges of the court may certify to the Supreme 
Court for original appellate review and determination any 
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magistrate's name on the warrant. This warrant shall be 
called a duplicate original warrant and shall be deemed a 
warrant for purposes of this chapter. In these cases the 
magistrate shall cause to be made an original warrant. 
The magistrate shall enter the exact time of issuance of 
the duplicate original warrant on the face of the original 
warrant. 
(b) Return of a duplicate original warrant and the 
original warrant shall be in conformity with this chapter. 
Upon return, the magistrate shall require the person who 
gave the sworn oral testimony establishing the grounds 
for issuance of the warrant to sign a copy of the transcript. 
(3) If probable cause is shown, the magistrate shall issue a 
search warrant. 1998 
77-23-205. Time for service — Officer may request as-
sistance. 
(1) The magistrate shall insert a direction in the warrant 
that it be served in the daytime, unless the affidavits or oral 
testimony state a reasonable cause to believe a search is 
necessary in the night to seize the property prior to it being 
concealed, destroyed, damaged, altered, or for other good 
reason; in which case he may insert a direction that it be 
served any time of the day or night. An officer may request 
other persons to assist him in conducting the search. 
(2) The search warrant shall be served within ten days from 
the date of issuance. Any search warrant not executed within 
this time shall be void and shall be returned to the court or 
magistrate as not executed. 1994 
77-23-206. Receipt for property taken. 
When the officer seizes property pursuant to a search 
warrant, he shall give a receipt to the person from whom it 
was seized or in whose possession it was found. If no person is 
present, the officer shall leave the receipt in the place where 
he found the property. Failure to give or leave a receipt shall 
not render the evidence seized inadmissible at trial. 1994 
77-23-207. Return — Inventory of property taken . 
The officer, after execution of the warrant, shall promptly 
make a verified return of the warrant to the magistrate and 
deliver a written inventory of anything seized, stating the 
place where it is being held. 1994 
77-23-208. Safekeeping of property. 
The officer seizing the property shall be responsible for its 
safekeeping and maintenance until the court otherwise or-
ders. 1994 
77-23-209. Return of papers to district court. 
The magistrate shall annex to the depositions and affidavits 
upon which the search warrant is based, the search warrant, 
the return, and the inventory. If he is without authority to 
proceed further with respect to the offense under which the 
warrant was issued, he shall return them to the appropriate 
court of the county having jurisdiction within 15 days after the 
return. 1994 
77-23-210. Force used in execut ing warrant — When 
notice of authority is required as a prerequi-
site. 
When a search warrant has been issued authorizing entry 
into any building, room, conveyance, compartment, or other 
enclosure, the officer executing the warrant may use such 
force as is reasonably necessary to enter: 
(1) if, after notice of his authority and purpose, there is 
no response or he is not admitted with reasonable prompt-
ness; or 
(2) without notice of his authority and purpose, if the 
magistrate issuing the warrant directs in the warrant 
that the officer need not give notice. The magistrate shall 
so direct only upon proof, under oath, that the object of the 
search may be quickly destroyed, disposed of, or secreted 
or that physical harm may result to any person if notice 
were given. i ^ 
77-23-211. Violation of health, safety, building, or ani-
mal cruelty laws or ordinances — Warrants to 
obtain evidence. 
In addition to other warrants provided by this chapter 
magistrates, upon a showing of probable cause to believe a 
state, county, or city law or ordinance, has been violated in 
relation to health, safety, building, or animal cruelty, may 
issue a warrant for the purpose of obtaining evidence of a 
violation. Warrants may be obtained from a magistrate upon 
request of peace officers and state, county, and municipal 
health, fire, building, and animal control personnel only after 
approval by a prosecuting attorney. A search warrant issued 
under this section shall be directed to any peace officer within 
the county where the warrant is to be executed, who shall 
serve the same. Other concerned personnel may accompany 
the officer. 1994 
77-23-212. Evidence seized pursuant to warrant not 
excluded unless unlawful search or seizure 
substantial — "Substantial" defined. 
(1) Property or evidence seized pursuant to a search war-
rant may not be suppressed at a motion, trial, or other 
proceeding, unless the unlawful conduct of the peace officer is 
shown to be substantial. 
(2) Any unlawful search or seizure shall be considered 
substantial and in bad faith if the warrant was obtained with 
malicious purpose and without probable cause or was ex-
ecuted maliciously and willfully beyond the authority of the 
warrant or with unnecessary severity. 1997 
C H A P T E R 23a 
I N T E R C E P T I O N O F COMMUNICATIONS 
Section 
77-23a-l. Short title. 
77-23a-2. Legislative findings. 
77-23a-3. Definitions. 
77-23a-4. Offenses — Criminal and civil — Lawful 
interception. 
77-23a-5. Traffic in intercepting devices — Offenses — 
Lawful activities. 
77-23a-6. Seizure and forfeiture of intercepting de-
vices. 
77-23a-7. Evidence — Exclusionary rule. 
77-23a-8. Court order to authorize or approve intercep-
tion — Procedure. 
77-23a-9. Disclosure or use of intercepted information. 
77-23a-10. Application for order — Authority of order -7 
Emergency action — Application — Entry 
— Conditions — Extensions — Recordings 
— Admissibility or suppression — Appeal 
by state. 
77-23a-l l . Civil remedy for unlawful interception — 
Action for relief. 
77-23a-12. Enjoining a violation — Civil action by attor-
ney general. 
77-23a-13. Installation of device when court order re-
quired — Penalty. 
77-23a-14. Court order for installation — Application. 
77-23a-15. Order for installation — Contents — Dura-
tion — Extension — Disclosure. 
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[• (vi) the configuration and location of signs, barri-
ers, and other means of informing approaching mo-
torists that they must stop and directing them to the 
place to stop; 
(vii) any advance notice to the public at large of the 
establishment of the checkpoint; and 
(viii) the instructions to be given to the enforce-
ment officers operating the checkpoint; 
(b) the magistrate makes an independent judicial de-
termination that the plan appropriately: 
(i) minimizes the length of time the motorist will 
be delayed; 
(ii) minimizes the intrusion of the inspection or 
inquiry; 
(iii) minimizes the fear and anxiety the motorist 
will experience; 
(iv) minimizes the degree of discretion to be exer-
cised by the individual enforcement officers operating 
the checkpoint; and 
(v) maximizes the safety of the motorist and the 
enforcement officers; and 
(c) the administrative traffic checkpoint has the pri-
mary purpose of inspecting, verifying, or detecting: 
(i) drivers that may be under the influence of 
alcohol or drugs; 
(ii) license plates, registration certificates, insur-
ance certificates, or driver licenses; 
(iii) violations of Title 23, Wildlife Resources Code 
of Utah; or 
(iv) other circumstances that are specifically dis-
tinguishable by the magistrate from a general inter-
est in crime control. 
(3) Upon determination by the magistrate that the plan 
meets the requirements of Subsection (2), the magistrate shall 
sign the authorization and issue it to the command level 
officer, retaining a copy for the court's file. 
(4) A copy of the plan and signed authorization shall be 
issued to the checkpoint command level officer participating in 
the operation of the checkpoint. 
(5) Any enforcement officer participating in the operation of 
the checkpoint shall conform his activities as nearly as prac-
ticable to the procedures outlined in the plan. 
(6) The checkpoint command level officer shall be available 
to exhibit a copy of the plan and signed authorization to any 
motorist who has been stopped at the checkpoint upon request 
of the motorist. 2001 
77-23-104.5. Signs —- Prohibitions. 
An enforcement officer may not display a sign that notifies 
motorists of an administrative traffic checkpoint unless the 
checkpoint is being operated under the authority of a magis-
trate as provided in Section 77-23-104. 2001 
77-23-105. Failure to stop — Criminal liability. 
Any person who intentionally and knowingly passes, with-
out stopping as required, any administrative traffic check-
point operated under the authority of a magistrate as provided 
in Section 77-23-104 is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 1992 
PART 2 
SEARCH WARRANTS 
77-23-201. Search warrants — Definitions. 
As used in this part: 
(1) "Daytime" means the hours beginning at 6 a.m. and 
ending at 10 p.m. local time. 
(2) "Search warrant" is an order issued by a magistrate 
in the name of the state and directed to a peace officer, 
describing with particularity the thing, place, or person to 
be searched and the property or evidence to be seized by 
him and brought before the magistrate. 2001 
77-23-202. Grounds for issuance. 
Property or evidence may be seized pursuant to a search 
warrant if there is probable cause to believe it: 
(1) was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed; 
(2) has been used or is possessed for the purpose of 
being used to commit or conceal the commission of an 
offense; or 
(3) is evidence of illegal conduct. 1994 
77-23-203. Conditions precedent to issuance. 
( D A search warrant shall not issue except upon probable 
cause supported by oath or affirmation particularly describing 
the person or place to be searched and the person, property, or 
evidence to be seized. 
(2) If the item sought to be seized is evidence of illegal 
conduct, and is in the possession of a person or entity for which 
there is insufficient probable cause shown to the magistrate to 
believe that such person or entity is a party to the alleged 
illegal conduct, no search warrant shall issue except upon a 
finding by the magistrate that the evidence sought to be seized 
cannot be obtained by subpoena, or that such evidence would 
be concealed, destroyed, damaged, or altered if sought by 
subpoena. If such a finding is made and a search warrant 
issued, the magistrate shall direct upon the warrant such 
conditions tha t reasonably afford protection of the following 
interests of the person or entity in possession of such evidence: 
(a) protection against unreasonable interference with 
normal business; 
(b) protection against the loss or disclosure of protected 
confidential sources of information; or 
(c) protection against prior or direct restraints on con-
stitutionally protected rights. 1994 
77-23-204. Examination of complainant and witnesses 
— Witness not in physical presence of magis-
trate — Duplicate original warrants — Re-
turn. 
(1) All evidence to be considered by a magistrate in the 
issuance of a search warrant shall be given on oath and either 
reduced to writing or recorded verbatim. Transcription of the 
recorded testimony need not precede the issuance of the 
warrant. Any person having standing to contest the search 
may request and shall be provided with a transcription of the 
recorded testimony in support of the application for the 
warrant. 
(2) When the circumstances make it reasonable to do so in 
the absence of an affidavit, a search warrant may be issued 
upon sworn oral testimony of a person who is not in the 
physical presence of the magistrate, provided the magistrate 
is satisfied that probable cause exists for the issuance of the 
warrant. The sworn oral testimony may be communicated to 
the magistrate by telephone or other appropriate means and 
shall be recorded and transcribed. After transcription, the 
statement shall be certified by the magistrate and filed with 
the court. This statement shall be deemed to be an affidavit for 
purposes of this section. 
(a) The grounds for issuance and contents of the war-
rant issued pursuant to Subsection (2) shall be those 
required by this chapter. Prior to issuance of the warrant, 
the magistrate shall require the peace officer or the 
prosecuting attorney who is requesting the warrant to 
read to him verbatim the contents of the warrant. The 
magistrate may direct that specific modifications be made 
in the warrant. Upon approval, the magistrate shall 
direct the peace officer or the prosecuting attorney for the 
government who is requesting the warrant to sign the 
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AMENDMENTS 
TO THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
AMENDMENT I 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, 
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of 
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, 
and to petition the government for a redress of grievances. 
AMENDMENT II 
A well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free 
State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed. 
AMENDMENT i n 
No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without 
the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be 
prescribed by law. 
AMENDMENT IV 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to 
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
AMENDMENT V 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous 
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except 
in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in 
actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person 
be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or l imb; 
nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation. 
18 
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CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES AMEND. X I V , § 5 
AMENDMENT XIV 
Section 1. 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which 
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; 
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws. 
Section 2. 
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States accord-
ing to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons 
in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote 
at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President 
of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and 
Judicial Officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is 
denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years 
of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except 
for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation 
therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male 
citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years 
of age in such State. 
Section 3. 
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector 
of President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under 
the United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken 
an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, 
or as a member of any State legislature or as an executive or judicial 
officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, 
shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given 
aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-
thirds of each House, remove such disability. 
Section 4. 
The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by 
law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for 
services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. 
But neither the United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt 
or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the 
United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; 
but all such debts, obligations, and claims shall be held illegal and void. 
Section 5. 
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, 
the provisions of this article. 
21 
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A. W. Lauritzen 
Attorney at Law/ Attorney for Defendant 
P. O. Box 171 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Telephone: (435) 753-3391 
TN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
COUNTY OF RICH, STATE OF UTAH 
FIRST DISTRICT COURT 
RICH COUNTY 
JAN 2 h 2002 
RECEIVED 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LAURA DABLE 
Defendant, 
p » « " " " " " * " ' ' » » » " " " » " « » » ^ ' ' • ' 1 • • ' 1 III —II. — — — — < 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Case No. 00110027 FS 
Judge Judkiois 
Please take notice that the Defendant Appeals the judgement of conviction and sentence 
entered on 10 JXEcember, 2001 to the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. 
Dated this'*^* day of December, 2 0 0 ^ 
Attorney at Law 
AWL/em 
j p B ' K f t M *-»fc O * ^ ^CftS <&*-«*©«-* Lr 
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A. W.Lauritzen(1906) 
Attorney at Law/ Attorney for Defendant 
P. O. Box 171 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Telephone: (435) 753-3391 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, COUNTY OF RICH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LAURA DABLE, : 
Defendant, 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE 
Case No. 00110027 FS 
FACTS AS PRESENTED BY THE CASE, 
1. In April of 2000 Officer Dale Stacey spoke with a man named Threll Orton after he had 
been arrested by Wyoming authorities and while he was incarcerated in Evanston, Wyoming; the 
arrest was based on a charge of allegedly selling Methamphetamine and Marijuana. Mr. 
Orton informed Officer Stacey that he had gotten the Methamphetamine which provided the basis for 
the Wyoming charge from a woman in Randolph named Laura, and a description of her residence 
was provided. 
2. On June 6,2000, Officer Stacey allegedly was contacted by Deputy Kim Clark from the 
Lincoln County, Wyoming Sheriffs Office, Officer Clark requested that officers in Randolph, Utah 
Page 1 of 20 
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watch out for a woman named Laura Dable who had a trailer on West Park Street. Officer Clark 
allegedly told Officer Stacey that an informant had told them Defendant was going to Ogden to pick 
up some Marijuana and Methamphetamine to sell in Lincoln County and that he felt that they had 
enough information to make a traffic stop and search the vehicle. Officer Stacey stated in a June 14, 
2000 report, "We did not see Dable in Randolph that evening.", referring to June 6,2000.l 
3, On June 7,2000, Officer Stacey allegedly received a telephone call from Officer Clark 
stating that Wyoming authorities had arrested Defendant, and that she had in her possession 
approximately 4 ounces of Marijuana and 8 grams of Methamphetamine. It was reported to Officer 
Stacey that Defendant admitted to Officer Kim Clark and Officer Jodie Gardner that she had bought 
the drugs in Ogden, and then stopped at her trailer in Randolph before proceeding to Wyoming 
where she was arrested. 
4, Officer Stacey, relying on the above information, prepared an Affidavit, a copy of which 
is attached hereto as Exhibit A. Officer Stacey, without assistance from the Rich County Attorney 
presented the Affidavit and a proposed Search Warrant, which warrant is attached hereto as Exhibit 
B. to Judge Ross McKinnon to " look over", at around 6:00 p.m on June 7,2000. 
5, Judge McKinnon, accepted the Affidavit as prepared by Officer Dale Stacey without 
noting changes, deletions or additions and based thereon issued a Search Warrant for the trailer of 
Laura Dable at West Park Street in Randolph, Utah, authorizing a search for controlled substances, 
packaging material, or any type of peraphcn alia us*d vidh illegal controlled substances. The search 
was conducted and was concluded at 22:35 hrs., sunset on June 7th, 2000 was at 20:59 hours. 
1
 All of the above data came from the notes of Officer Stacey, provide to Defendant by the 
Rich County Attorney's office pursuant to a Discovery request served by Defendant. 
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DISCUSSION 
6. Search and seizure is a powerful tool for law enforcement but is also one of the more 
intrusive and degrading of motions available to law enforcement. 
7. The Fourth Amendment of the Constitution states, "The right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and affects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated..." In short, this amendment requires that authorities have 
'probable cause' and obtain proper authorization before they may search the residence of any 
person.. This authorization, in the form of a search warrant, must also describe in detail the place 
be searched and the items that may be seized in order for the items to be admissible in a court of la 
To discourage abuse and violation of the Fourth Amendment the Supreme Court of the United 
States, has invoked the Exclusionary Rule; See Weeks vs United States 232 U.S. 383 (1914) and 
Mapp vs Ohio 367 U.S. 643 (1961). The exclusionary rule declared that all evidence obtained by 
searches and seizures in violation of Constitutional mandate are inadmissible in Federal court. The 
exclusionary rule was likewise made applicable to State Courts procedures pursuant to operation of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.2 
ISSUES 
The MOTION TO SUPPRESS filed in this case presents several issues to the court; they 
being: 
POINT I: 
The Informant Threll Van Orton was clothed by the Affiant with indicia of reliability which 
were not warranted by the facts available to that Affiant. 
2
 Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963) 
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POINT II: 
Indicia of the reliability of the Informant Threll Orton as presented by the AflSant are 
insufficient to allow the magistrate to credit any part of the information provided. 
POINT III: 
There was, under the facts known to the AflSant no necessity for the Search Warrant to be 
issued justifying a NIGHT SEARCH, nor did the search warrant specify whether or not the 
Defendants privacy might be invaded to the extent of a Night time Search. 
POINT IV: 
The AflSant had no factual basis to support any contention of reliability of the informants, 
Officers Kim Clark and Jody Gardner or that their unnamed informant was reliable. 
POINT V: 
The list of property as authorized to be seized by the search warrant is vague, non-specific. 
POINT VI: 
There is no factual basis recited within the Affidavit upon which the Magistrate might make a 
finding of'probable cause'. 
DISCUSSION 
POINT I: 
The Informant Threll Van Orton was clothed by the Affiant with indicia of reliability 
which not warranted by the facts available to that Affiant 
8. "In determining whether there is probable cause... [we] are concerned only with the 
question whether the AflSant had reasonable grounds at the time of his affidavit... for the belief 
that the law was being violated on the premises to be searched;"3 
9. "Similarly, inasmuch as the existence of probable cause must be established by fresh facts, 
so the execution of the warrant should be done in timely fashion so as to ensure so far as possible 
3Dumbra v. United States, 268 U.S. 435.439.441 (1925V M[T]he term fprobable 
cause'...means less than evidence which would justify condemnatioa11 
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the continued existence of probable cause."4 
10. In the Affidavit dated June 7, 2000, obtained at 6:30 pm. by Officer Dale Stacey and 
presented to Magistrate Ross McKinnon; the Affiant omitted the salient facts that the information 
gained from informant Threll Orton was gained two months prior to the Affidavit and that the 
information was given while Mr. Orton was in custody in Wyoming. In Harris, it was held that"... 
that the informants observations may be too stale to support issuance of the warrant .5 If the 
information obtained in April 2000 was deemed reliable, why was no search warrant sought by 
Officer Stacey at that time? How can passage of time enhance the value and reliability of that 
information? 
11. If the Defendant makes a substantial showing that an Affidavit containing a false 
statement which was made knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, 
and if the allegedly false statement is necessary to the finding of probable cause, The warrant may be 
suppressed oi? thart basis alone."6 
12. Referring to #10 of the Affidavit, PROBABLE CAUSE, Officer Stacey states, "Threll 
Orton informed your affiant that he had bought Methamphetamine from Laura Dable at the trailer 
described in this affidavit on at least two occasions", referring to the report of Officer Stacey dated 
6/14/00 we find the statement;" Back in April, a man named Threll Orton was arrested in 
Evanston, Wyoming, for selling Methamphetamine and Marijuana. — Officer Weston and I spoke 
4
 Sgro v. United States, 287118.206(1932). 
'United States v. Harris 403 U.S. 573 (1973) 
6U.S. Supreme Court, Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154(1978) 
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to Orton while he was still in jail. He told me that he had gotten the Methamphetamine he sold 
from a woman in Randolph named Laura." It should be noted here that Orton apparently only said, 
"a woman in Randolph named Laura", not 'Laura Dable', as Officer Stacey writes in the affidavit. 
How then was there a credible belief that this woman was indeed Laura Dable, how many women in 
Randolph are named Laura? How does Officer Stacey, in light of the April report justify this 
statement that Defendant had sold Marijuana twice? 
13. Officer Stacey in his report, writes that informant Orton told the Affiant he bought his 
Methamphetamine from, "the person living in the described trailer." we refer to the 6/14/00 
Deputy report stating that Orton, "described where she lived; referring to "a woman in Randolph 
named Laura." The Affidavit, based on that record, would have no value to a neutral and detached 
Magistrate and such information as is provided is totally conclusory in nature. Certainly the facts 
recited in the Affidavit would lead no one to conclude that Laura Dable's actual residence is one and 
the same as the one described by the informant. A Magistrate cannot rely only on a conclusion 
arrived at by the officer, he must rely on facts and arrive at his own conclusions if he is to make 
sound judgement and give force to the Fourth Amendment. 
14. It is contended that the information given to Officer Stacey by the informant and that 
given by Officer Stacey in the Affidavit presented to the Magistrate vary remarkably one from the 
other and one can only conclude that the omissions were made with reckless disregard for their truth 
and import and, on an objective basis, amounted to "bad faith."7 
15. It is not so onorous a requirement that Officer Stacey himself was the one who 
interviewed Threll Orton in April 2000, and on that basis he should have been sufficiently familiar 
7U. S. Supreme Court, Franks v. Delaware, (Supra) 
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with the information to recite it fully and correctly in the affidavit to the Magistrate, and Officer 
Stacey should have, of necessity, relied on the substance of his notes of this interview in his 
affidavit. 
POINT II: 
Indicia of the reliability of the Informant Threll Orton as presented by the Affiant are 
insufficient to allow the magistrate to credit any part of the information provided. 
16. Referring to # 9 of the Affidavit, RELIABILITY, Officer Stacey lists that the reliability 
of his informant, that being Threll Van Orton is, "statements against his penal interest", this is totally 
conclusory and he makes no mention that the informant was under arrest and was incarcerated at the 
time of that statement, nor was the magistrate informed that the statement was received 2 months 
prior to the Affidavit, which information might well have caused the Magistrate to conclude that 
there was scant reason to believe that the alleged illegal activity of 2 months prior was still going 
on. 
17. Is there any reason given why this infomant should be clothed with credibility or 
truthfulness? Had the informant ever been an informant before? Had Officer Stacey ever met or 
known of the informant before April 2000? Why no mention that the informant was charged with 
serious crimes which feet itself might affect the Magistrates determination? It has been said that 
"... there was no substantial basis for believing that the tip was truthful. Indeed, it [must be] 
emphasized that the Affiant had never alleged that the informant was truthful, but only "prudent," a 
word thai' s/fcoifies that he is circumspect in the conduct of his affairs, but reveals nothing about his 
credibility." Unites States v. Harris 412F.2d (1969)8 
*Cf United States v. Harris.403 U.S. 573(197n 
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18. There is no evidence to show that since April 2000 there has been further contact with 
informant Orton, inferring a thread of credibility. There is not enough information here as to the 
credibility of this informant for the magistrate to make a judgement as to reliability of Threll Van 
Orton.fln the case of Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969), Mr. Justice Harlan made it 
plain that where police rely on an informant to justify a search and seizure, they must know that the 
informant is generally trustworthy and that he has obtained his information in a reliable 
way. As put by that worthy Justice: "I would only insist that this judgement be that of the 
magistrate, not the law enforcement officer who seeks the warrant...., the agent surely could describe 
for the magistrate such things as the informer's general background, employment, personal attributes 
that enable him to observe and relate accurately, position in the community, reputation with others, 
personal connection with the suspect, any circumstances which suggest the probable absence of any 
motivation to falsify, the apparent motivation for supplying the information, the presence or absence 
of a criminal record or association with known criminals, and the like. "Spinelli, Supra at p. 417y 
19. The instant case fails to demonstrate that the informant was known to be trustworthy, and 
conversely supports only the conclusion that the affiant had no knowledge as to the informants 
credibility and would therefore be hard pressed to find a reason to credit truthfulness to informants 
statements. This informant, as presented by the Affiant, provides no facts to support probable cause 
for the search and seizure. 
20. In Harris it was said that Nathanson held that "Under the Fourth Amendment, an officer 
may not properly issue a warrant to search a private dwelling unless he can find probable cause 
therefor from facts or circumstances presented to him under oath or affirmation. Mere affirmance of 
belief or suspicion is not enough. "Nathanson at p. 47.) It has been argued that Nathanson should 
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be limited to holding that reputation, standing alone, was insufficient. But this is the precise 
problem here - only the Defendant's reputation has been seriously addressed in efforts to establish 
the credibility of the informant, an element of probable cause entirely severable from the requirement 
that the .. source be reliable."9 
21. "This case presents the question of how our decisions in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 
(1964), and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969). apply where magistrates, in issuing 
search warrants, are faced with the task of assessing the probable credibility of unidentified 
informants who purport to describe criminal activity of which they have personal knowledge, and 
where it does not appear that such informants have previously supplied accurate information to 
law enforcement officers."10 
25- In this case, we find that the informant states he bought his drugs from, "a woman named 
Laura in Randolph", but there is no amplifying or corroborating information to back up his claim, 
which information would provide a substantial basis for finding probable cause, and neither does the 
affidavit set forth the reliability of the informer in sufficient detail to indicate that the tip was based 
on the informant's personal observation.^' Aguilar v. Texas held insufficient an affidavit which 
merely asserted that the police had "reliable information from a credible person" that narcotics were 
in a certain place and held that when the affiant relies on an informant's tip he must present two types 
of evidence to the magistrate. First, the affidavit must indicate the informant's basis of knowledge -
the circumstances from which the informant concluded that evidence was present or that crimes had 
United States v. Nathanson, 290 U.S. 41 (1933) 
l0United States v. Harris,(Supra) 
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been committed- and, second, the affiant must present information which would permit the 
magistrate to decide whether or not the informant was trustworthy."11/ 
23. In the absence of a statement detailing the manner in which the information was gathered, 
it is particularly important that the tip describe the accused's criminal activity in sufficient detail that 
the magistrate may know that he is relying on something more substantial than a casual rumor 
circulating in the underworld or an accusation based merely on an individual's general reputation.12 
In Spinelli it was said that "The detail provided by the informant in Draper v. United States, 358 
U.S. 307 (1959). provides a suitable benchmark.... A magistrate, when confronted with such detail, 
could reasonably infer that the informant had gained his information in a reliable way." In the Draper 
case the informant went into such minute detail, that there was no question but that the informant 
was reliable and had gained his information in a reliable way. As to the information gained from the 
Informant Orton, there is no corroboration by way of a foliowup investigation after the time this 
information was received in April 2000 by Officer Stacey to allow the Magistrate to determine that 
the information was obtained in a reliable way and that the informer was generally trustworthy. 
Rather, the Orton statement needed further support, as the information was several months old, and 
were not fresh facts, so as to ripen into a judgement that a crime was probably being committed. 
24(JSpinelli teaches that a simple assertion of police suspicion is not itself a sufficient basis 
for a magistrate's finding of probable cause, we do not believe it may be used to give additional 
weight to allegations that would otherwise be insufficient." In this same case, the Court applied 
"See also Jones v. United States362 U.S. 257 (1960VThis series of cases metamorphises 
into the "Two prong test" of Aguilar & Spinelli. 
,2Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410(1969) 
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Aguilar in a situation in which the affidavit contained both an informant's tip and police information 
of a corroborating nature. The Court rejected the 'totality" test derived from Jones [v. United 
States] and held that the informant's tip and the corroborating evidence must be separately 
considered.YThe tip in this case should be rejected because the affidavit contained neither any 
information which showed the current validity of the tip nor any information which showed the 
informant's credibility. The affidavit here does not sufficiently set forth feicts and circumstances from 
which the magistrate might properly have concluded that the informant, in purporting to detail his 
personal observation, was probably telling the truth. 
25. The Harris court went on to say that... "The central point of the discussion of probable 
cause in Aguilar is, as perhaps more precisely emphasized by our explicit twin holdings in Spinelli,. 
at 416. that the two elements necessary to establish the informer's trustworthiness - namely, 
that the tip relayed to the magistrate be both truthful and reliable - are analytically severable. It is not 
possible to argue that the information might have been fabricated. This is why our cases require that 
there be a reasonable basis for crediting the accuracy of the observation related in the tipy In short, 
the requirement that the magistrate independently assess the probable credibility of the informant 
does not vanish where the source of the tip indicates that, if true, it is trustworthy." 
POINT HI: 
There was, under the facts known to the Affiant no necessity for the Search 
Warrant to be issued justifying a NIGHT SEARCH, nor did the search warrant specify 
whether or not the Defendants privacy might be invaded to the extent of a Night time Search. 
2t- Referring to # 6 of the Affidavit, Officer Staoey provided oo reason why the search must 
be accomplished at night, the property receipt, inventory and return noting the time of the search as 
22:35 on June 7,2000. Defendant contends, in that the return establishes a Night time Search with 
Page 11 of 20 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
no reason given to justify the same. That there has been a clear violation of the Statute (UCA 77-23-
205) which violation standing alone, provides sufficient reason to suppress the resultant search. 
Time clearly was not of the essence in this case, as the Defendant, whose property was to be 
searched, had this same day been arrested and was presently incarcerated in Lincoln County, 
Wyoming. As a practical matter Defendant could not have personally destroyed evidence that a 
warrant might ultimately have discovered, and Defendant was, presumably, effectively isolated from 
anyone connected with the alleged drug activity who might have gone in and destroyed evidence. 
Those persons, in all probability, would not have even known that the Defendant had been arrested. 
Extraordinary circumstances- such as the imminent destruction of vital evidence, clearly were not an 
issue here and it is apparent that the official in executing a Night Time Search, exceeded his authority 
under the warrant.13 The failure of the magistrate to limit the search warrant in and of itself nullifies 
the search warrant. 
27. Referring to # 7 of the Affidavit, NO KNOCK, the Affiant makes no attempt to justify a 
No Knock warrant and nevertheless, the Magistrate does not restrict the warrant, again a clear 
violation of the statute. In all cases, it must be remembered that a warrant is not personal to the 
Affiant, it authorizes any official to execute the same. (UCA 77-23-201) 
POINT IV: 
The Affiant had no factual basis to support any contention of reliability of the 
informants, Officers Kim Clark and Jody Gardner or to establish that their unnamed 
informant was reliable. 
28. Officer Stacey refers to other informants as Officers Kim ClarK and Jody Gardner, of the 
Lincoln County Sheriffs Office, but he supplies no evidence that these persons are the arresting 
,3Miller v. United States 357 U.S. 309 See also Wong Sun v. United States371 U.S. 
471(1963) 
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officers holding Defendant in Wyoming. No facts are supplied with in the Affidavit or otherwise 
which would allow a neutral and detached Magistrate to conclude that these informants are reliable 
or that the informants had provided any credible information. Again, the Magistrate must be 
provided with facts sufficient to conclude that a citizen might necessarily be deprived of 
Constitutional protections. It is apparent from the Affiant that Wyoming authorities had relied on an 
informant; yet those authorities had provided the Affiant with no indicia of reliability. 
29. Under # 10 PROBABLE CAUSE in the Affidavit, Officer Stacey tells of a conversation 
with the two officers used as informants, Deputies Kim Clark and Jody Gardner, but provides no 
facts as to the credibility of their anonymous informant and omits the important feet that Laura Dable 
indeed had been arrested, facts that might direct an informed finding that drugs or drug 
paraphernalia would be located at Defendant's residence. 
30. In Spinelli (Supra) the Court imposed an important limitation when it said that, "[this] 
Court's cases have already rejected for Fourth Amendment purposes the notion that the past 
reliability of an officer is sufficient reason for believing his current assertions.tf 
POINT V: 
The list of property as authorized to be seized by the search warrant is vague, non-
specific. 
31. The warrant does not purport to particularly describe the things to be seized but, instead 
seems to leave it entirely to the discretion of the officials conducting the search to decide what 
items to seize. It is said that, "The Fourth Amendment does not countenance open-ended warrants 
to be completed while a search is being conducted and items seized or after the seizure has been 
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carried out."14 
32. The requirement that warrants shall particularly describe the things to be seized makes 
general searches unlawful, the question becomes; what was the Peace OflScer serving the warrant 
directed to seize, was that issue left to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant?15 The 
question becomes; what is the officer to look for and where is he to look? The warrant is of no 
assistance in answering this threshold question. 
33. The Courts have ruled previously that a warrant issued to permit a seizure of "mere 
evidence" is not justifiable for a warrant," historically, the right to search for and seize property 
depended upon the assertion by the Government of a valid claim of superior interest, and that it 
was not enough that the purpose of the search and seizure was to obtain evidence to use in 
apprehending and convicting criminals."16 
34. "As the Court said in United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581,595 (1948). "a search is not 
to be made legal by what it turns up. In law it is good or bad when it starts and does not change 
character from " what is dug up subsequently. (Emphasis added)."17 
POINT VI: 
Regardless of the infirmities noted above, there is no factual basis recited within the 
Affidavit upon which the Magistrate might make a finding of'probable cause9 for issuance of 
,4LO-JI SALES,INC. V. NEW YORK, 442 U.S. 319(1972)p. 325,326. 
per ron v/. United States * " US. 192,196 (\9H), 
4iSee also Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294.303 (1967). See Gouled v. United States, 255 
U.S. 298. 309 (1921). The holding was derived from dicta in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 
616.624-29(1886) 
,7Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963) 
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i 
a warrant. 
35. "History teaches us that this protection requires that the judgement of a judicial officer be 
I 
interposed between the police, hot in pursuit of their appointed target, and the citizen; that the 
judicial officer must judge and not merely rubber-stamp; and that his judgment must be based 
upon judicially reliable facts adequate to demonstrate that the search is justified by the probability 
that it will yield the fruits or instruments of crime...""... the fundamental role of the magistrate's 
judgement in the preservation of a proper balance between individual freedom and state power." 
Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, (1948) at page 700. 
36. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, decided in 1961, held for the first time that the Fourth 
Amendment exclusionary rule enunciated in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) was 
applicable to the States cf Wolf v. Colorado (1948). That Amendment provides that search 
warrants shall not be issued without probable cause. The existence of probable cause is a question of 
feet that calls for a considered and correct determination.18 
37. Emphasis upon the necessity of warrants interposes the judgement of an independent 
magistrate between the exuberance of law enforcement officers and the privacy of citizens and 
authorizes invasion of the privacy only upon a showing that constitutes probable cause." 19 
38. "The point of the Fourth Amendment" is "it's protection - in requiring that those 
inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer 
18Sprnelti * United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969) 
19While the exceptions may be different as between arrest warrants and search warrants, 
the requirements for the issuance of the two are the same. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108,112 
IL3(1964. Also, the standards by which the validity of warrants are to be judged are the same, 
whether federal or state officers are involved. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963). 
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engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime. Any assumption that evidence 
sufficient to support a magistrate's disinterested determination to issue a search warrant will justify 
the officers in making a search without a warrant would reduce the Amendment to a nullity and leave 
the people's homes secure only at the discretion of police officers."20 
39. For a magistrate to be able to determine probable cause for issuing a search warrant, 
there are "two test of the validity of the power of the issuing party to so act." "He must be neutral 
and detached, and he must be capable of determining whether probable cause exists for the requested 
arrest or search."21"Good faith is not enough to constitute probable cause. That faith must be 
grounded on facts within knowledge of the officer which in the judgement of the court would make 
his faith reasonable."(U-S. v. Ross 456 U. S. 798(1982)page 2164. To determine "probable cause" 
"An applicant for a warrant must present to the magistrate facts sufficient to enable that judicial 
officer himself to make a determination of probable cause. "In determining what is probable cause... 
[w]e are concerned only with the question whether the Affiant had reasonable grounds at the time of 
his affidavit... for the belief that the law was being violated on the premises to be searched; and if the 
apparent facts set out in the affidavit are such that a reasonably discreet and prudent man would be 
led to believe that there was a commission of the offense charge, there is probable cause justifying 
the issuance of a warrant."22 
20Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10,13-14(1979). 
2,Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345, 354 (1972) 
^Dumbra v. United States, 268 U.S. 435,439,441 (1925V "[T]he term 'probable cause' 
... means less than evidence which would justify condemnation." Lock v. United States, 11 U.S. 
(7 Cr. 339,348 (1813). See Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498,504-05 (1925V It may rest upon 
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40. It has been emphasized that the issuing magistrate "must judge for himself the 
persuasiveness of the facts relied on by a [complainant] to show probable cause"; 23likewise, "An 
insufficient affidavit cannot be rehabilitated by testimony after issuance concerning information 
possessed by the Affiant but not disclosed to the magistrate."24 and "... Mere conclusory assertions 
are not enough."25 
41. In the present case, we find the officer asserting his belief that there may be illegal drugs 
and drug paraphernalia at the residence of Defendant, but the Affiant provides 
no credible information establishing that the searched location is occupied by Defendant or that any 
contraband might presently be located there. 
42. We refer here to the Affidavit for case # 00-0381 of Rich County in the State of Utah, 
given by Affiant Dale M. Stacey, referring to # 5 on page 2, there were no amplifying documents, 
supplying the magistrate with any record of any conversation of an interview with informant Threll 
i 
Orton by Officer Stacey, and secondly, referring to # 5 on page 2, we find no amplifying documents 
supplying the magistrate with record of any conversation between officers Clark and Gardner of 
Lincoln County Wyoming and Affiant. The point of the Fourth Amendment is, it's protection - in 
evidence which is not legally competent in a criminal trial, Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 
307311 (1959), and it need not be sufficient to prove guilt in a criminal trial. Brinegar v. United 
States, 338 U.S. 160. 173(1949). See United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102. 108-09(1965). 
^Giordenillo v. United States, 375 U.S. 480,486 (1958). 
24Whftetey v. Wtmten, 401 U.S. 560 0971;. 
25
 Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480 (1958) (complainant merely stated his 
conclusion that defendant had committed a crime). See also Nathanson v. United States, 209 U.S. 
4L(1933). 
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requiring the inferences that must be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being 
judged by the officer. 
43. As was said in Aguilar, "It is, of course, of no consequence that the agents might have 
had additional information which could have been given to the Commissioner. It is elementary that in 
passing on the validity of a warrant, the reviewing court may consider only information brought to 
the magistrate's attention." 
44. The Affiant states in the Affidavit that "Dable informed the officers that she had bought 
the drugs in Ogden on 6-6-00 and had stopped at her residence in Randolph for several hours 
before going on up to Lincoln County. Here, there are no facts provided to the magistrate that 
her residence referred to is a trailer, on Park Street, no description is given, and as we refer to 
the Report, of 6/14/00, "On June 6, Officer Clark asked me if our officers could watch for Dable. — 
We did not see Dable in Randolph that evening." The further question arises, what officer did 
Defendant inform? 
45. Further under probable cause, Affiant states, "Your Affiant feels there is probable 
cause to believe some of the drugs bought in Ogden were left in the trailer, because there have 
allegedly been sales made from the trailer to people in this county." here again we have a naked 
conclusion, there are no facts provided to the magistrate which would form a basis upon which the 
Affiant might conclude, as he did, that sales were made or that they were made to residents of 
Randolph, Utah. 
46. We refzv to the Psputy report dated 6/M/05, where information reported, but not 
supplied to the magistrate, Officer Stacey writes, "They [Lincoln County officers] had also found 
some pay sheets on her that listed some clients in Randolph, specifically John and Eddie Cooper." 
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I 
Referring to papers supplied to Defendants attorney, and provided herewith, there is nothing noted 
other than numerals and names, no amounts or kinds of drugs which would qualify the notes as 
"pay sheets" for drugs as Officer Stacey contends. 
47. The Court in Harris after reviewing the earlier cases26 held that, "The final component of 
the probable cause equation,... is that it must appear reasonably likely that the informer's claim that 
criminal conduct has occurred or is occurring is probably accurate. The cases establish that this 
element is satisfied only if there is reason to believe both that the informer is a truthful person 
generally and that he has based his particular conclusions in the matter at hand on reliable data, 
for it is not reasonable to enter another's premises on the basis of information, even if it appears quite 
damning when simply taken at face value, unless there corroboration of its trustworthiness. The fact 
that the magistrate has determined that the agent probably truthfully reported what the informant 
conveyed cannot, of course, establish the credibility or reliability of the informant himself. More 
immediately relevant here, the cases have established that where the Affiant relies upon the assertions 
of confidential informants to establish probable cause, the affidavit must set forth facts which enable 
the magistrate to judge for himself both the probable credibility of the informant and the reliability of 
his information, for only if this condition is met can a reviewing court be satisfied that the magistrate 
has fulfilled his constitutional duty to render an independent determination that probable cause 
exists". 
CONCLUSION 
Thus, vchfte stnct rules of evidence certainly do not govern magistrates' assessments of 
26Aguilar; Spinelli ;Giordinello; Nathanson; Whitely; 
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probable cause, it would require a rather extensive relaxation of current requirements to permit 
reliance on what was provided to the Magistrate in this case and that coupled with the irregularities 
as to the form of the warrant and the affidavit; and in light of several noncompliances with statute; 
and in light of the unsupported conclusions of the Affiant the search warrant executed in connection 
with this case here should be suppressed. 
Respect&jL 
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IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
RICH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LAURA DABLE, 
Defendant. 
Case No. 001100027 
Transcript of Audio Tape. 
Transcript of Motion to Suppress Hearing. 
Honorable Clint S. Judkins presiding. 
First District Court Courthouse 
Randolph, Utah 
June 26, 2001 
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County Attorney 
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Attorney at Law 
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Brigham City, UT 84302-0873 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Page 2 
THE COURT: Take the case of State of Utah versus 
21 Laura Dable. This is the time set for argument on 
I plaintiff's motion to — excuse me. Defendant's motion to 
4| suppress- Mr. Lauritzen, 
51 MR. LAURITZEN: Yes, Your Honor. I have submitted 
61 briefs in this matter. I think that this is a case that 
7 1 probably stands out of my repertoire of practice before the 
8 1 many courts in this land as an area where people simply just 
9 J don't take the Fourth Amendment seriously. I sometimes 
10 wonder if the justice of the peace system, in their 
111 instructions, don't tell the judges to go ahead and deal with 
12 1 these things and expect that a higher court will take care of 
13 it. 
14 This is kind of shocking case in a way because there is 
151 simply no basis on which one could credit the information 
16 that was supplied to the justice with any aura of 
17 1 credibility. Certainly the officer had some information two 
18 1 months before from an individual who he didn't know from a 
191 bale of hay, so to speak. He didn't do anything to 
20 investigate that information, to verify anything that was 
21 given to him there. In fact, he didn't really open an 
22 investigation as far as is shown on the affidavits. 
23 1 Thereafter, two months later, he was apprised of 
241 something that involved my client and on that basis he dug 
25 out this old information and provided it to the justice, 
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1 still not knowing anything about the credibility of the 
2 individual who supplied the evidence or having given any 
3 subsequent investigation to see if there was any basis for it 
4 from his own knowledge. The justice apparently looked at the 
5 matter rather uncritically and signed the warrant. I just 
6 canft see how, under the circumstances, that this is an area 
7 which we can allow to go on. 
8 Then, the warrant itself is a blank. Some of the areas 
9 were filled in and some of the areas'were not. It seems to 
10 me that that's a serious default in itself because it leaves 
11 areas open for someone to modify. It isn't like the peace 
12 1 officer who comes in and raises his right hand is necessarily 
131 the one who serves the warrant. The want is to any peace 
14 officer. Who knows whose hands those might pass through? So 
15 the warrant itself seems to me to be very suspect. 
16 I suggest that under the circumstances there was 
17 1 certainly no need for a hurry. In fact, the defendant was 
18 under arrest in another jurisdiction. The telephones were 
19 available for a warrant. There was plenty of time to 
20 transcribe all of these matters into the original without use 
21 of a printed formed so that the directions were clear and not 
22 subject to abridgement or change. 
23 Again, I'm not going to belabor it, but I've gone into 
24 several areas. One of the things that I'm concerned about is 
25 when the justice looked at the warrant he should have 
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1 probably noted that the individual had not been Mirandised. 
2 That may very well have caused him to question it if that had 
3 been — if that information had been given him, that there 
4 was — had been no Miranda. 
51 But more seriously, probably more seriously than any of 
61 the things we see here in this particular warrant, is the 
7 1 fact that there were some omissions of some very serious 
8 matters which could very well have colored the thinking of 
9 the magistrate. If he had known that the information that 
10 was supplied to the officers, and which was narrated to him 
11 in the affidavit, was taken from a person who was being held 
12 under arrest un-Mirandised and who had a good deal to gain, 
13 possibly, by providing information in exchange for his 
14 freedom. None of this was noted on the affidavit. 
15 It isn't like someone came up, a citizen came up and 
16 volunteered and said I have some information as a concerned 
17 citizen. I'm completely — and in this particular case I 
18 have no axe to grind. When we have a person who is under 
19 duress, who is under arrest, I think that should certainly be 
20 noted. I think that was a serious omission. 
21 All in all, I suggest that the warrant was of such a 
22 nature and was issued based on an affidavit with some 
23 deficiencies to the point that in fact the search itself was 
24 invalid and was not justified by the strictures of the Fourth 
25 Amendment and any evidence seized thereby should be 
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ll suppressed, 
THE COURT: Mr. Greenlief, 
MR. GREENLIEF: I have not had the privilege of 
reading Mr. Lauritzen's memo in response to plaintiff's 
5 opposition of the defendant's motion to suppress. It says 
61 that it was sent on the 16th day of May. I have no reason to 
71 believe it was not. I just -- it's not in my file. I talked 
81 to my secretary and she didn't know about it, hadn't heard of 
9 it either, but I stand as the one at' fault because it's my 
101 office and I don't think it's the secretary's fault. I just 
111 didn't get it in any event. 
12 However, the main thing which Mr. Lauritzen speaks of 
131 this morning, and also in his briefs and so forth, is that 
14 the trouble with the information garnered from the defendant 
15 in the Lincoln County prison — or Lincoln County jail. 
16 Maybe it was Uintah County. No, I believe it was — okay, it 
17 1 was Uintah County. It was down south of us here. 
18 But the key to the entire thing is that the primary thing 
19 that the officers were relying on is that there was 
20 information from two very good — well, two other officers in 
21 Uintah County, Evanston, that the defendant had been stopped 
22 and was at that time in jail in Uintah County in Evanston for 
23 drug matters. That's the way I understand the case and 
24 that's the key to it. These two officers knew what they had 
25 found and that's pretty well set forth in the briefs and so 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Page 6 
1 forth. 
2 So the information of Therell was not necessary. It was 
3 supportive, as was stated in our original response. And that 
4 is all that it actually was. It was put first simply because 
5 it happened first by a couple of months, but that was not the 
61 actual thing. 
7 It's my understanding that Mr. Orton was given his 
8 J Miranda again by — well, no. He was not because he was not 
9 given it because he wasn't charged. * They were just talking 
10 to him about this particular lady. He wasn't the focus of 
11 any thought by the Rich County officers, so at that time it 
12 wasn't necessary to give him the Miranda. He was in jail, 
13 but it wasn't because of anything Rich County had done. 
14 I believe on those bases we'll submit it. 
151 THE COURT: Rebuttal? 
16 MR. LAURITZEN: I'll submit it, Your Honor. 
17 THE COURT: Well, one problem that you've got, 
18 counsel, both of you is that nobody has given me a firm set 
19 of facts in this case. Now, Mr. Lauritzen, you've alleged 
20 certain facts in your original memorandum in support of the 
21 petition to suppress. Since nobody objected to that I can 
22 only assume that those facts are true and accurate. 
23 The facts that the court finds in this case are that in 
24 April of 2000, Officer Stacey spoke with a man named Therell 
25 Orton after he'd been arrested by Wyoming authorities and 
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1 while incarcerated in Evanston, Wyoming. And that Officer 
2 Stacey got in — Mr. Orton informed Officer Stacey that he'd 
3 gotten the methamphetamine, which provided the basis for the 
4 Wyoming charge, from a woman in Randolph named Laura and a 
5 description of the residence was provided. 
6 Now, you've not disputed that, Mr. Greenlief. Is that 
7 1 then correct? 
8 MR. GREENLIEF: We've not disputed that he said 
9 Laura. 
10 THE COURT: But he didn't say Laura Dable? 
11 MR. GREENLIEF: No, but there are no other Lauras in 
12 Randolph, to my knowledge. 
13 THE COURT: Well, how do we know that? Did the 
I * * 
14 affidavit state that? So the court finds that as a fact, 
15 that — 
16 MR. GREENLIEF: I believe, Your Honor, if I may. 
17 THE COURT: Try me out. 
18 MR. GREENLIEF: I believe he did give a description 
19 of the trailer and of the outside of it and so forth. An 
20 eight on the front, the color, where it was on the south 
21 end — excuse me, the north end of the trailer court on Park 
22 Street. 
23 THE COURT: I don't think there's any question, even 
24 though that Mr. Lauritzen didn't put that in his statement of 
25 facts, and which you didn't address in your memorandum, that 
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1 the trailer was described with specificity, but I think --
2 1 let's look at the affidavit that was submitted in support of 
3 1 the request for the search warrant. 
4I (Pause in the proceedings.) 
5 1 THE COURT: Yes. It says Therell Orton told your 
61 affiant that he was able to buy methamphetamine from Laura 
7 1 Dable. Already, however, itfs agreed that that was Laura, 
8 not Laura Dable, the person living in the described trailer. 
91 There is a description of the trailer. Dable was arrested in 
101 Lincoln County, Wyoming on 6/7/00 for possession of 
111 methamphetamine and some marijuana. Mr. Lauritzen, there's 
12 1 no dispute as to that? 
13 MR. LAURITZEN: No. 
14 THE COURT: All right. The court further finds that 
15 this Therell Orton did not say Laura Dable, he said, Laura, 
16 but then went on with specificity and described a trailer, 
17 1 which is the trailer which is the subject of the search. 
18 That occurred in April of 2000. Then, on June 6th, 2000, 
19 Officer Stacey was contacted by Deputy Kim Clark from Lincoln 
20 1 County, Wyoming and Officer Clark told Officer Stacey that an 
211 informant had told them the defendant was going to Ogden to 
22 pick up some methamphetamine and marijuana to sell in Lincoln 
23 1 County and apparently he was going to stop and search the 
24 vehicle. Mr. Lauritzen, you'll agree that those are facts? 
25 MR. LAURITZEN: They were in the affidavit. 
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1 MR. GREENLIEF: Also, I believe Jody Gardner was the 
2 additional officer from Uintah County in Wyoming, In Lincoln 
3 County, rather, 
4 THE COURT: Kim Clark and an Officer Jody Gardner, 
5 both officers in Lincoln County, Wyoming. Then your next 
6 facts, Mr. Lauritzen, indicate, and the court will so find, 
7 that there was a telephone conversation between Officer 
8 Stacey and Officer Kim Clark and Officer Jody Gardner from 
9 Wyoming, wherein they indicated that' they had a confidential 
10 informant who had indicated that the defendant was going to 
11 pick up methamphetamine in Ogden. All right. 
12 Then we'll go to number four of the facts set forth by 
13 Mr. Lauritzen. Officer Stacey relied upon the above 
14 information prepared in the affidavit, a copy of which-is 
15 attached hereto as exhibit A. Officer Stacey, without 
16 assistance of Rich County, presented the affidavit with the 
17 proposed search warrant. 
18 Wait a minute. Let's go back to number three of Mr. 
19 Lauritzen's alleged facts. It says it was reported to 
20 Officer Stacey that the defendant admitted to Officer Kim 
21 Clark and Officer Jody Gardner that she had bought the drugs 
22 in Ogden and had stopped at her trailer in Randolph before 
23 proceeding to Wyoming where she was arrested. 
24 Mr. Lauritzen, what I would like you to do, Ifm going to 
25 direct your attention to a couple of things here and ask you 
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1 to give me your position on them. 
2 MR. LAURITZEN: Okay. 
31 THE COURT: That is, do you feel that the admission 
4 1 made by your client on 6/7/00 to the Lincoln County officers 
51 did not constitute sufficient probable cause to authorize the 
61 issuance of a search warrant? And if so why not? 
7 1 MR. LAURITZEN: Because, number one, she didn't say 
8j that she picked up or left any drugs at the trailer. 
9 J THE COURT: But she did admit she was there? 
10 MR. LAURITZEN: That she stopped there. The second 
111 reason is because in fact she had told the officers that she 
12 J had picked up the drugs in Ogden. I mean, it isn't like she 
131 told them she had picked them up at her trailer. She could 
14 1 have stopped there for any reason, but she was nonspecific in 
15 that. 
161 And third, the officers themselves are not automatically 
17 1 entitled to credit for reliability. The officers, assuming 
18 1 they were officers, and I have no reason to believe they were 
191 otherwise, still have got to be given some aura of 
201 credibility. They just can't state that, state something and 
211 take it at face value. There has to be something to back it 
22 J up. Probably the officers here in Rich County have in the 
231 past dealt with these fellows. I don't know. They are 
24 1 silent in that area and that concerns me. 
251 It could have been green officers faced with their first 
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1 arrest; faced with not enough evidence themselves to make an 
2 arrest and wanting to get some more evidence. They may have 
3 had some reasons for their own to go ahead and try to supply 
4 facts which would allow them to ultimately gain additional 
5 evidence. I donft know that. 
6 The other reason, of course, is that Ms. Dable herself 
7 was under arrest at that time. There's no evidence before 
8 this court at this time that she had been Mirandised. 
9 THE COURT: Do you think that there's some case law 
10 that says she has to be? 
11 MR. LAURITZEN: I can't find any, but I suggest that 
12 that's certainly a factor that the justice should take into 
13 consideration, whether or not the person had been warned, 
14 number one, of their right to remain silent which would give 
15 them ease in dealing with the police. I think that's the 
16 whole reason for the Miranda is to give them ease and not 
17 feel threatened, realizing that they have certain rights. 
18 And with that in mind they might be more likely, number one, 
19 to speak truthfully or, number two, not to speak at all. 
20 Anyway, those are the reasons I give the court. 
21 THE COURT: Okay. I'll direct your attention to 
22 another deficiency in the search warrant and hear your 
23 position on that. That is the, and this causes some concern 
24 to the court, the search warrant says you are therefore 
25 commanded to make immediate search in the day time, any time 
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II day or night, of the person of the vehicles described as, and 
2 J then it goes on to say one small RV trailer, single axle, and 
31 describes the premises. 
4 1 Where it says in the day time, any time day or night, was 
51 never marked, crossed off, et cetera. Section 77-23-205 says 
61 the magistrate shall insert a direction in the warrant that 
71 it is to be served in the day time, unless the affidavit or 
81 oral testimony states a reasonable cause to believe that a 
91 search is necessary in the night to seize the property prior 
10I to it being concealed, destroyed, damaged, altered or for 
111 other good reason, in which case he may insert a direction 
121 that it be served any time of the day or night. And the 
13 officer may request other persons to assist in conducting the 
14 I search. 
15 This search, as I understand it, and again the facts as 
161 alleged by Mr. Greenlief in his memorandum in opposition 
171 thereto, indicates that this search began at 6:32 p.m. Now, 
181 at 6:32 p.m. on June 7th of the year 2001, is that day time 
19 or night? 
20 MR. LAURITZEN: That was in the day time. I'll 
211 agree with that. 
22 THE COURT: All right. Anything else, Mr. 
231 Lauritzen, you'd like to bring to my attention? 
24 MR. LAURITZEN: No. 
251 THE COURT: I'm going to deny the motion to suppress 
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1 and in so doing indicate the following. I've made certain 
2 findings here. I'm going to find that the information 
3 provided by the peace officers out of Lincoln County, Wyoming 
4 was such that it did not require any more verification of a 
5 J reliable witness other than being peace officers, because 
6 they just relaid information that she'd picked up drugs in 
7 Ogden and told them that she'd stopped in — at her residence 
8 1 or this trailer as described in Randolph, and then down to 
9 Wyoming. 
10 If the information had of required some sort of 
11 subjective reasoning on behalf of the witness, that is the 
12 1 person providing the information, then I think the police 
13 officers should have gone into it further. But the mere fact 
14 that the police officers were conveying a confession and the 
15 facts of that confession, and the fact that they were police 
16 officers, and I don't have the case directly at hand, but 
17 there is a case which indicates that under certain 
18 circumstances the mere fact that it is a police officer 
19 relaying the information, that police officer can be assumed 
20 to be a reliable witness unless there's seme reason why it 
21 should not be. In this case he is just relaying that. I 
22 find that's the reason why additional information was not 
23 required of those witnesses. 
24 I find that the time frame, from the time that this Orton 
25 provided the information being nearly two months, in this 
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1 particular case is not determinative of striking a search 
2 warrant. Normally stale information is not a basis for the 
3 issuance of a search warrant in and of itself. However, 
4I stale information may be used as background information only. 
5 J And in this case that background information, even though it 
61 took place a couple of months before, or at least the 
7 information was provided a couple of months before, gave a 
8 basis for this during the course of the history, sometime or 
9 another, provided a place for this type of activity to take 
10 place. 
11 One thing I will note that bothers me, that is that the 
12 affidavit does not link up Laura Dable with the name Laura 
13 and the residence. I think they can be assumed, but the four 
14 concerns of the document have to provide the information for 
15 the magistrate to do that. Sheriff, you did not say to the 
16 magistrate, magistrate, they said Laura. I know Laura Dable 
17 and they described the residence and I know Laura Dable lives 
18 at that residence. That's missing in this and the court 
19 acknowledge that. Nevertheless, taking the totality of the 
20 circumstances, I still will not grant the motion to suppress. 
21 There's another thing that should be included in this and 
22 that is that the court finds that the -- from the facts 
23 before it at this time, and whether it actually occurred or 
24 not, but for the purposes of rendering this decision, Mr. 
25 Lauritzen, I find that the defendant was not Mirandised bv 
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1 the Lincoln County sheriff's office when she provided that 
2 information. At least there's nothing in the document which 
3 indicates that, Mr. Lauritzen has indicated that he's not 
4 been able to find any case law which would require that she 
5 be Mirandised. That may be something that the appellate 
6 court should look at to give a basis for that, for them to 
7 take a look at it. The court will find, though, for today's 
8 purpose I cannot find that she was Mirandised, but I find 
9 that that doesn't make a difference for the purpose of this 
10 search warrant. 
11 Now, also, the order should include that even though the 
12 search warrant itself does not indicate — it troubles me 
13 that the search warrant itself does not indicate that it was 
14 to be served day time, night time or at any time. Because it 
15 was served during the day time, the court does find that that 
16 is not a basis to strike. If it was served in the evening, 
17 then the court — the decision of the court here today may be 
18 something different. But where it was not served in the 
19 evening, I find that that made no difference whatever to the 
20 search warrant. 
21 Now, who would like to prepare the order? 
22 MR. LAURITZEN: I will. 
23 THE COURT: Mr. Lauritzen --
24 MR. GREENLIEF: I was going to suggest we kind of 
25 work on it together. 
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MR. LAURITZEN: That's fine. 
THE COURT: You can do whatever. What I've done is 
make certain findings. For example, the not Mirandising the 
defendant, Mr. Lauritzen, you very well may want to put that 
together in case you want to take that up on appeal. I think 
I've given you sufficient information for an appellate court 
to review that. 
8 J I think it's often been said that the appellate court is 
91 last, but they are after me. I have to make certain 
10 J decisions and give them a basis for review. But at this 
11 point the court will deny the motion to suppress. 
12 With that, do we need to set this matter for trial? 
13 MR. LAURITZEN: Yes, please. 
14 THE COURT: Do you want a one day jury trial? 
15 MR. LAURITZEN: I think that should be sufficient? 
16 THE COURT: Any need to expedite it, Mr. Lauritzen? 
17 MR. LAURITZEN: No. 
18 THE COURT: Becky, what do we have about September? 
191 (Pause in the proceedings.) 
20 THE COURT: Mr. Lauritzen, how does the 4th of 
21 October appear? 
22 MR. LAURITZEN: That's fine. 
23 THE COURT: Ms. Dable, you have the right to a 
24 speedy disposition in this matter. This has been pending for 
25 some time. What we've just set here is it will pend until 
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1 October. Are you willing to waive your right for a speedy 
2 1 disposition until that time? 
3 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
4 1 THE COURT: Very well. All right. Anything else to 
51 address as relates to Ms. Dable? 
MR. LAURITZEN: Not that I can think of. 
THE COURT: Any other matters that need to come to 
the court's attention today? 
MR. LAURITZEN: None that I know of. 
MR. GREENLIEP: No. 
THE COURT: Hearing none, we111 be in recess. 
(Hearing concluded.) 
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C E R T I F I C A T E 
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the audio taped hearing was 
transcribed by me, Rodney M. Felshaw, a Certified Court 
Reporter and Certified Court Tape Transcriber in and for 
the State of Utah, residing at Brigham City, Utah, 
That a full, true and correct transcription of the 
hearing, to the best of my ability, is set forth in the 
pages numbered 2 to 17, inclusive. 
I further certify that the original transcript was 
filed with the Court Clerk, First District Court, Rich 
County, Randolph, Utah. 
I also certify that I am not associated with any 
of the parties to said matter and that I am not interested 
in the event thereof. 
Witness my hand this 21st day of October, 2002. 
^S^^±I^li3ddc^. 
Rodney M.T/Felshaw, C.S.R., R.P.R, 
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FIRST DISTRICT RICH COURT 
RICH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
I A I r IUTES 
SENTENCING 
SENTENCE. 
LAURA DABLE, 
Def en da J i t 
1 1. L J'! :: ! CLINT S. 
December 
JUDKINS 
13, 2001 
PRESENT 
Clerk: beckyp 
Prosecu 1:or : GREENI.IEF, « J0E 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney* LAURITZEN B W 
DE FEN DANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: December 29, 1957 
Audio 
Tape I lumber : !.. "i 30 J 
CHARGES 
ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE (amended) i i Degree 
Felony 
PI e a : G u i 11} D i s p o s i t i o n : 1 0 / 0 4 / 2 0 01 { G u i 11 y P1 e a } 
.LEGAL -OSS/USE OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE (amended) - Class- B 
Misdemeanor 
I: 1 f : & m 'I J U 
HEARING 
sposi Li i)i I :  0 1 2 Guilty i 
TAPE: 121301 A Certificate -of probable cause was presented. 
Sentence to be suspended until appeal perfected. 
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Case No: 001100027 
Date: Dec 13, 2001 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is 
sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in 
the Utah State Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
.SENTENCE JAIL 
Based on the defendant's conviction of ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is 
sentenced to a term of 30 day(s) 
Based on the defendant's conviction of ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE a Class B Misdemeanor, the defendant is 
sentenced to a term of 180 day(s) The total time suspended for 
this charge is 180 day(s). 
SENTENCE FINE 
Charge # 1 Fine: $800.00 
Suspended: $0.00 
Surcharge: $367.57 
Due: $800.00 
Charge # 2 Fine: $600.00 
Suspended: $0.00 
Surcharge: $275.68 
Due: $600.00 
Total Fine: $1400.00 
Total Suspended: $0 - \ 
Total Surcharge: $643.25 \
 vr
/\ ^ 
Total Principal Due: $1400.00 7*f -H^ 
Plus Interest^ 
The imposition of sentence is stayed and the defendant is placed on 
probation. 
Page 2 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Case I lor 001100027 
. 3 t e : Dec 1 3 , 2 
PROBATION CONDITIONS 
Defendant will e n t ei I nt o ag r e eme nt w i t h P r obat i on and ab ide by a1J 
terms and conditions. 
Prison term is suspended upon successfuJ completion of probation. 
C omp 1 e t e alcohol and o i d r u g c o u n s e 1 i n g p a ) a J I f e e s =i i: : „ il f :i ] ^  * 
notice of completion with the Court. 
Consume o r p o s s e s s n o a 1 c o h o 1 ' d r u g s f i e q u e n t n: i c p 1 a c e s a 1 c o h o 1 
serve d o r c o n s u m e d i n c 1 u d i n g t: a i: s, p a r t i e s, J i q i i c ' r s t:' : < i: e 
Violate no laws. 
S u b m i t t o r a n d o m s e a r c h a i I d s e i z u i: e . 
Keep C o u r t i n f o rme d o f c u r r e n t a dd r e s s w 1 i i ] * < : > i :i p r o b a t i D r i, 
No association with known criminals. 
Defendant, shall c omp 1 e t e R e 1 a p s e W o r kb o o k 
Defendant r -..-;-*-- - " am of two a > r . ;: . • : contacts per 
week 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the following people for case 
001100027 by the method and on the date specified. 
Method 
Name 
Mail 
A. W. Lauritzen 
P.O. Box 171 
Logan, Utah 84321 
By Hand Joe Greenlief 
Dated this 14th day of January, 2002. 
/ 
p^t^C^c^ f*-&** 
Deputy Court Clerk 
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IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13| 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
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RICH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
vs. 
LAURA DABLE, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. 
Case No. 001100027 
Transcript of Audio Tape. 
Transcript of Sentencing Hearing. 
Honorable Clint S. Judkins presiding. 
First District Court Courthouse 
Randolph, Utah 
October 4, 2001 
APPEARANCES: 
For the Plaintiff: 
For the Defendant: 
JOE A. GREENLIEF 
County Attorney 
A. W. LAURITZEN 
Attorney at Law 
RODNEY M. FELSHAW 
Registered Professional Reporter 
First District Court 
P. O. Box 873 
Brigham City, UT 84302-0873 
fYn u J 
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T H E C O U R T . I i t , ' ' 1 ::, : I M : ' I :1 ..« 3 : i ' "" L fit. l:,i 2 : 1 1 it ah 
plea negotiation in this case. Is that correct? 
MR. IAURITZEH: T h a 1 , ••• n i n e c I ,„ '" III il  T he 
state is going to amend the information by interlineation and 
I I | ' i iini i II I i w in II ! ! i I 11 b e i nqi a 1 I" i 
d e g r e e f e l o n y a i id a C1 a s s El i1 i i s d e m e a n o i 1 1: :i„a,t w i l l b e j u s t a 
ma 1 t e r o f d r o p p I i , ; 11 ^  • • s c l :i. ooJI e i i.l i, a,i i. :: s in ,; 11.. t 
MR. GREENLIEF: Ai id we w i l l f u r t l l e r men 
THE COURT V e r y w e l l . T h e l e t f s h a v e c u u n a t x c o m e 
• IE ' • *' •• 1 • : : .^  I i" ...i 1 ...I: , • ^ I • ..' . g , ^ : ^ i * i t '.: ::'.! i i \- • ^  • ""!!!:::::::i; ^ : •] 
MR GREENX*IEF: T h e s t . i t e w i l l I , II ^ agree, if 
' ^
 :; 3
-
 :
 i 1 •' • j ! i •• i i • • i • • " " i • t ,„ 11 , „ f ., ': „ ' : 1 :i f. i ^ .t „ I : ;: •. .;, I ' <: : ill : j :» 
a s e i p p r o p i - -i P t j IIH . 
THE COURT: T h a t ' s o n t h e m o t i o n t o s u p p r e s s ? 
***> U I U R I T 2 E N : ! I! ^ , ft i ,„ " ill | h i . , ]::: 1 ' • ' , 1:: >j II I: „ =• h a;; : l i . « 
not an uncondi lona ea. xu a plea -serving the issues 
resented in the motion to suppress 
THE COURT: id we have a prelim in this ^adt rather 
IJ than a waiver? 
MR. IAURZTZEN: think we waived the prelim. 
COURT can go back and look at the minutes if 
-'" need t i. .- *a-ver :o;io, ^<^n 
25 I p I 
1 
2 
.:; 
4 
:: 
7 
I I 
9 
:i o 
:i mi 
1 2 
3 3 
I! I, 
] 5 
1 6 
1 
20 
23 
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lj MR. LAURXTZEN: She was before the court, I'm sure, 
2 J because we set the matter for trial. 
3 1 (Pause in the proceedings.) 
4 1 THE COURT: Ms. Dable, youTve had an ample 
5 I opportunity to discuss this matter with your attorney? 
6 1 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
7 J THE COURT: He has explained all of this to your 
8 1 satisfaction so you feel that you understand what is going on 
91 right now? 
101 THE DEFENDANT: Sort of. I mean — 
11J THE COURT: Do you want additional time to talk with 
12 1 Mr. Lauritzen? 
131 THE DEFENDANT: No. I understand what he's said. 
141 THE COURT: Did you consume any alcohol or drugs 
15 before you came in here today? 
161 THE DEFENDANT: No. 
I71 THE COURT: Do you feel that you're thinking 
18 J clearly, able to make a reasoned decision right now? 
19 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
201 THE COURT: Now, you understand that a third degree 
211 felony carries with it a possible prison sentence of up to 
22 1 five years and a fine of up to $5,000. A Class B misdemeanor 
23 1 carries with it a possible jail sentence of six months and a 
24 1 fine of a thousand dollars. Those fines could have an 85 
25 1 percent surcharge assessed as well. Do you understand that 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1 
2 
3 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
? a D e 4 
thai could be the . *. :iu 
THE DEFENDANT: fes 
THE COURT: You understand that this penalty could 
b e i n a d el i t: 1 i) i „ t o e a c :  \ , ^  ' t , I: * , 3 T! , , I i i ^  e a c I: i c f t: J:i e ' o u i 11 , 
you could be sentenced on what we call consecutive sentences. 
L . ; a*- : .;: a • 
THE DEFENDANT - QVau, 
THE COORT ^ l -. that by | lend nc 
to these chai^^.- • vC .He bidte u proving your guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt in a trial of this matter. n 
understand that if we had a trial it would be a jur\ 
ai I ::! " ' :: " 1! :i 1: • 2 s :•: t: a s s :: :  -n as j: : '. ssi I:: J :: ' s :: i t i ;oi i ,ii ! ::i t 3 a sp ::* 2 i1! 
1 3 j t::i::i a J We had that tz ::ii :: I set for t: : : :1c ,"  r , but if you were to 
change your mind we would reset it as s< >n as possible. 
At . _ ; 
oL,aue imu pxa element of the offenses alleged beyond 
^,,, - rstify. Mr. Lauritzen ,, , i ,„ attorney could 
= ^  - : '" - ' • • " i. i ' "• • ' t J: , ., ' ' ' r. i I ,„ ; „• , , , ^  , ,, ' „ i - • Jl I I , „ „ ; ^  £ , l „, ; „ ; • i| , „, ; ] ] 
"•ess---*- You would have the right to 
subpoena them to ensure that they would be at the trial. Yoii 
" 111 I »••" s t j f v b u t t > 11 I \f | v' i ' M w a n t c d I  Il II 11 111 te I i I Il i 
you. rhat would be voluntary on your part. 
* t r : a • «<• ^ - , \ . .
 : > ~ . ~a' 
L :/: r i a | p • I| I I ,F f t * r : i mi i You ui iderstand that you have a l l of 
1 5 
17 
1 ^  1:  
J 9 
2 : 
21 
22 
23 
2 ! 
25 
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these rights? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: You understand that if you plead guilty 
here today you give up or waive these rights? 
MR. LAURITZEN: Your Honor, at this point we need to 
make it clear that this is a plea not without conditions. 
THE COURT: Why don't you set that forth for the 
record, counsel. 
MR. LAURITZEN: This plea is entered on the express 
condition that she reserves the right to have the superior 
courts of the state of Utah review her motion to suppress and 
the evidence in connection therewith. And this reservation 
is — in other words, she's not, even though she realizes 
that some of her rights are extinguished by her plea, her 
right to appeal is not and she gets the full right to appeal 
all of the issues raised in the motion to suppress before 
this court. 
THE COURT: You understand, though, that this appeal 
that Mr. Lauritzen is talking about is the only right you 
would have to appeal from the decision this court made on the 
motion to suppress? You understand that there wouldn't be 
introduced any evidence in a trial, therefore you could not 
appeal any trial court's decision to an appellate court, you 
understand that? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
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1 MR. IAURITZEN: You're waiving your right to a 
2 J trial. You might present information, for instance, that no 
3 I matter what stuff was in your house it belonged to a third 
4 I person. You would be precluded from that, which I don't 
51 suppose is one of the defenses we contemplated, but I've 
6 1 giving that as an example. 
7 I The only thing we're talking about is the invalidity of 
B J the warrant and the affidavit in support of the warrant that 
9 I was presented to the judge who issued the warrant and their 
10 1 effect upon the ultimate search of your premises, do you 
11J understand that? 
12 1 THE DEFENDANT: Okay. 
13 1 THE COURT: Very well. Now, has anyone promised you 
14 J anything or threatened you with anything to get you to plead 
15 1 guilty to these two counts, other than as represented to the 
161 court by Mr. Lauritzen a few minutes ago that it be reduced 
17 J to a third degree felony and a Class B misdemeanor and you 
18 1 would reserve the right to appeal the court's decision on the 
191 motion to suppress? Anything else? Mr. Lauritzen, you're 
20 J standing. 
211 MR. LAURITZEN: The only other thing is the state 
22 J has agreed not to oppose a motion for certificate for 
23 I probable cause if one is filed in this case. 
24 J THE COURT: Anything else? 
25 MR. IAURITZEN: Not that I know of. 
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11 THE COURT: Very well. The charge, Ms. Dable, count 
2 J one, now reads possession or use of a controlled substance in 
3 I a drug free zone in violation of Utah Code Annotated section 
41 58-37-8 (2) (a) (i), a third degree felony, as follows. That on 
5 J or about June 7th of last year, in Rich County, the defendant 
6 1 did knowingly and intentionally possess or use a controlled 
7 1 substance, to whit methamphetamine, a class two substance. 
8 J Count two now reads possession or use of a controlled 
9 J substance in a drug free zone in violation of Utah Code 
10 Annotated section 58-37-B (2) (e), a Class B misdemeanor, as 
111 follows. That on or about June 7th, 2000, in Rich County, 
12 J the defendant did knowingly and intentionally possess or use 
13 1 less than one ounce of marijuana, a schedule one controlled 
14 substance, and committed the offense. 
15 1 To those two counts, how do you plead? 
16 1 THE DEFENDANT: Guilty 
171 THE COURT: Mr. Greenlief, give us the factual basis 
18 1 for the two counts, please. 
1 9
 MR. GREENLIEF: This material was in her home, the 
201 meth. And subsequent to a — it was found by a search 
21 warrant signed by a local justice of the peace, as I recall. 
22 And the county sheriff on June 7th, 2000, went in and looked 
23 1 through the home and found the meth and also the marijuana on 
24 1 the 7th of June here in Rich County. 
25 1 THE COURT: Ms. Dable, you heard the facts 
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Page 8 
represented to us by Mr. Greenlief. Are you pleading guilty 
because you committed the offense as he's described it? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: The court will receive the guilty pleas, 
finding the same to be made freely and voluntarily. This 
appears to be a case where a presentence report would be 
helpful to the court. Counsel, what have you done about 
coordinating sentencing with your appeal? 
MR. LADRITZEN: I suggest she needs to be sentenced 
before the appeal. 
THE COURT: Do you want to proceed with that today? 
MR. LADRITZEN: I suggest we get the presentence 
report. The results of that may very well affect her 
ultimate decision whether to appeal or not. 
THE COURT: Very well. Becky, when do we have 
something in about six weeks? 
(Pause in the proceedings.) 
THE COURT: How does the 13th appear, counsel? 
MR. LAURITZEN: Fine. 
THE COURT: That's a little more than 45 days. Ms. 
Dable, you have the right to be sentenced in not less than 
two nor more than 45 days. Will you waive that time frame so 
we can proceed with the presentence report? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: Very well. I need to advise you that 
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1 C E R T I F I C A T E 
2 I 
3 J THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the audio taped hearing was 
4 1 transcribed by me, Rodney M. Felshaw, a Certified Court 
51 Reporter and Certified Court Tape Transcriber in and for 
61 the State of Utah, residing at Brigham City, Utah. 
7 I That a full, true and correct transcription of the 
8 J hearing, to the best of my ability, is set forth in the 
91 pages numbered 2 to 9, inclusive. 
10 1 I further certify that the original transcript was 
11 filed with the Court Clerk, First District Court, Rich 
12 J County, Randolph, Utah. 
13 1 I also certify that I am not associated with any 
14 I of the parties to said matter and that I am not interested 
15 1 in the event thereof. 
161 Witness my hand this 23rd day of October, 2002. 
17 
19 | Rodney M. LFelshaw, C.S.R., R.P.R. 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
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ll even though this has been set clear into December, it will 
2 1 take AP&P nearly that long to prepare the report. You need 
3 I to set iup an appointment with them and keep those 
4 1 appointments. It has been my policy that if they don't have 
5 J that report prepared because you were tardy in reporting to 
I i 
I 1 
6| them or keeping appointments, then you will have to go to 
7 I jail until they complete that process. 
8 I I Also need to further advise you that if you want to 
9 I change your mind and withdraw the plea made here today, you 
10 J would ijiave to file that motion within the next 30 days for 
i 
111 the court to even consider it, 
121 MR. LAURITZEN: Your Honor, there is an officer from 
13 I Adult Probation and Parole here today. I'll have her talk to 
14 J her briefly. 
151 THE COURT: Very well. If you'll meet with this 
161 young lady over here she'll help you out. Very well. 
17 J (Hearing concluded.) 
IB 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
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APPLICATION FOR 
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A. W. Lauritzen 
Attorney at Law/ Attorney for Defendant 
P. O. Box 171 
Logan, Utah 84321 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
COUNTY OF RICH, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
PlaintuT, 
vs. 
LAURA DABLE 
Defendant, 
APPLICATION FOR CERTIFICATE 
OF PROBABLE CAUSE 
Case No. 00110027 FS 
Judge Judkins 
COMES NOW THE Defendant with this her application for a certificate of probable cause 
and alleges 
1. Defendant pleaded guilty conditionally to the charges on which she is to be sentenced 
on 13 December, 2001 
2. Defendant conditioned her plea reserving the question of 
A. The validity of the Search Warrant 
B. The adequacy of the underlying affidavits 
C. The question of whether the Search Warrant was issued on probable cause 
D. Certain other irregularities and inadequacies raised by pleadings filed in this 
case 
3. Defendant certifies that probable cause exists for appeal and that the issues 
r> x.^> Q 
' / > 
> 
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I 
have merit and are arguable and have not been heretofore addressed by the Appellate Courts in 
this jurisdiction and case law exists that is supportive of Defendants position 
Defendant suggests that a certificate of probable cause is warranted in this case 
Dated this day of December, 2001 
A. W. Lauritzen 
Attorney at Law 
AWL/em 
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APPENDIX G 
AFFIDAVIT FOR 
SEARCH WARRANT 
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DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
RICH COUNTY 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant(s) 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
Case No. fiO~QZFt . 
AFFIDAVIT 
RICH COUNTY ) 
) 
STATE OF UTAH ) ss 
Affiant, being first duly sworn, states on oath that: 
1. OFFICER I am a peace officer in the State of Utah 
employed for 7/? years by tfkk (?u~4y Slw.ffs Off,c*. 
2. PROPERTY. The property or evidence for which a search 
warrant is sought is described as follows: T1l«jal Co«fal\-<i.l j«6sf*.Hc^  
3. LOCATION. I have probable cause to believe this,property 
or evidence is located on the person v^ vehicle v premise 
(check those that apply) described as: (the description must be so 
specific that the location could be found by one not knowing where 
it is) . /J /^,,'fc -fr^'itr i^iiis 8k* Tfiln /*»«»/«/ j'uif &$-(- of <?$ iJtsf 
fa.il S{«-e\ »V» RthjAfh. %ete if A </ir/Jfc Y o« fhe &"+ o*f ikt ira/fer 
W a Tip oui o* iki. ^rfU &st rti*. %t -h-^kris rk„w.'«j AJ«& W 
SOJIK «KJ /S fr.™*jd<J by <K fact. ~7h? 4/«x is cc^i^J-d u^iu yt*s1*e( 
Mis <*J ^ S^K vn«b «inV-. ifon / / A Bk< M ~M* * 4*»*r 
5«Wn W t A ^ ^ ^ S ^ l ^ s ^ ******* 
K ^ £ w <y - ^ 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
RICH COUNTY \ 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff. 
vs . 
/*ur«. flablt Defendant (s ) . 
SEARCH WARRANT 
case NO. nfl-osrl 
\ 
THE STATE OF UTAH TO ANY PEACE OFFICER IN THE COUNTY OF RICH, 
STATE OF UTAH: 
Proof by affidavit was made before me this day by 
that there is probable cause for issuance of a search warrant. 
YOU ARE THEREFORE COMMANDED to make immediate search, (in the 
daytime)(anytime, day or night) of the person of 
of the vehicles described as: / S*ml\ #(/ jratUr, £*'•*/* **l<. UJ^U h*i (w<J <*-
of the premises described as: \fjl*M lf^Mrj^!t\r\ glue 7nVv,; Uc«\eJ JU5f £<j 
4r«A*f *J a ^0 •*+ °^ +^* A/*fV» &s+ sAt*. fa -failic is r«"w,'»y ^ f c W r ^ <*-^l i 
for the following property: - C^ -fo/lW SuhSmric^ pacKaaivLQ i>hciiena(t qf a^u ji 
If you find any of the property described above, or any 
part thereof, bring it before me immediately at his court and 
make return within 10 days, as required by Utah Code Ann. 
Section 77-23-1 et seq. 
You (are)(are not) authorized to execute this search warrant 
without giving prior notice of your authority and purpose. 
DATE SIGNED: TUWJY> " 7 - &Q TIME SIGNED: 
JUDGE 
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Affidavit for Search Warrant, page 2 
4. STATUTORY GROUNDS. I have probable cause to believe this 
property or evidence (check those that apply and fill in blank with 
name of crime). 
L 
was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed 
has been used or is possessed for the purpose of being 
used to commit or conceal the commission of the offense of SSfai dltif 
5. ATTACHMENTS. The following attachments are incorporated in 
this affidavit as though set forth herein: (list written 
informants1 statements, documentary evidence and other exhibits) 
Exhibit 1 -
Exhibit 2 -
Exhibit 3 -
Exhibit 4 -
Exhibit 5 -
6. NIGHT SEARCH. I have reasonable cause to believe a search is 
necessary in the night as follows: (state why property may be 
concealed, damaged, altered or other good reason). 
7. NO KNOCK. I have the following evidence which allows the 
search to be conducted without notice of authority and purpose: 
(state why the object of the search may be quickly destroyed, 
disposed of or secreted or why physical harm my result to a person 
if notice is given). 
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AFFIDAVIT for Search Warrant, page 3 
8. ANONYMOUS INFORMANTS. The following are designations of 
anonymous informants: 
Their identity is withheld because (state why the informant would 
be endangered or his usefulness destroyed if name was* stated) 
t 
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AFFIDAVIT for Search Warrant, page 4 
9. RELIABILITY. I believe the informants named herein to be 
reliable for these reasons: (check those that apply) 
z _the following informants made statements against their penal interest: ffofl| yor1 Offa\ 
_the following informants are citizen informers who have no 
interest in this matter: (also state which ones are known to you 
personally) 
/ the following informants are peace officers with the 
departments noted: tivttofa (c<x^k sAwfij m^4 -. ({in* C/mL <W TZL <Ww«C 
JL .the fo l lowing informants are r e l i a b l e because ( s ta te the 
name of each informant an£ f a c t s corroborating h i s statement or 
previous r e l i a b l e statements) "ffotii Ork>^ Uo Unr «f&»^ "jtaf A* «*»J c\Uf^ 
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AFFIDAVIT for Search Warrant, page 5 
10. PROBABLE CAUSE. The following facts establish that probable 
cause exists for the issuance of a search warrant: (state the 
specific facts of the case, state how they were observed, state the 
date they were observed and the date they were reported to affiant) 
0C(a<>iov\S, 
-/k< U*<*U &rvk $l*r$-(l Office. Kvea i*ik«ld /^f ~*ty u/€f^ ***£'*) o»\ 
A jltoj («it ! **uJ f/><*( A SonfclrMtat /*krwtant f<rU ffo«*, ^ „ f £aur<i 0<*lfk "XtS 
^Vtcdn & A /o se/L dvy 4-7-oo) (bbk «J«S styf*J **J kir vrtok S**ti«J. 1k< 
(\a\M i*p»*W -/k ff-Pficm m she U b°*ft\ -fa «*jf * ^ ^ **» *V-<?<9 
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AFFIDAVIT for Search Warrant, page 6. 
DATE SIGNED: fjl+vJL 7, , f e o TIME SIGNED: iXiO 
Affiant 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this / day of \\U,*JJC^~ , £997 
< ^ A m*k:^ 
Judge 
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APPENDIX H 
RICH COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE 
DEPUTY REPORT 
6/14/00 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
11/22/00 — Rich Co. Sheriffs Office 
•*T5T39 Deputy Report Page: 
1. Incident: Search Warrant. 
2. Location: Randolph, UT 84064 
3. Other Information: On June 7, 2000, at around 3:00 P.M., I spoke 
with Deputy Kim Clark from the Lincoln County Wyoming Sheriff's Office. 
He had also spoken to me the day before about a woman named Laura Dable. 
Dable has a trailer on West Park Street in Randolph. 
On June 6, Officer Clark asked me if our officers could watch for Dable. 
He said that they had an informant that told them Dable was going to 
Ogden to pick up some Marijuana and Methamphetamine to sell in Lincoln 
County. He felt that they had enough information to make a traffic stop 
and search the vehicle. We did not see Dable in Randolph that evening. 
On.June 7, Officer Clark called to let me know that they had arrested 
Dable. At the time of the arrest, she had approximately 4 ounces of 
Marijuana and 8 grams of Me thamphet amine. They had also found some pay 
sheets on her that listed sgmg rl-jfint-g in Randolph. Specifically John 
and Eddie Cooper. Dable told Officer Kim Clark and Jodie Gardner that 
she had bought the drugs in Ogden, and then stopped at her trailer in 
Randolph before proceeding to Wyoming. 
Back in April, a man named Threll Orton was arrested in Evanston, 
Wyoming, for selling Methamphetamine and Marijuana. After the arrest 
was made by the Wyoming Officers, Officer Wayne Weston and I did a 
consent search on Orton's house. We found some paraphernalia and 
approximately 14 ounces of Marijuana. Officer Weston and I spoke to 
Orton while he was still in jail. He told me that he had gotten the 
Methamphetamine he sold from a woman in Randolph named Laura. He also 
described where she lived. The description fit Laura Dable's trailer on 
Park Street. This information seemed consistent with the information I 
was receiving from Officers Kim Clark and Jodie Gardner. At that time I 
decided to write a Search Warrant for Dable1s trailer in Randolph. 
Because of the lateness of the hour (around 6:00 p.m.), I asked Justice 
Court Judge Ross McKinnon to look over the warrant. I felt there was a 
good chance that Dable would contact some of the people she had been 
dealing with and they would remove the evidence from the trailer if we 
didn't find it first. Judge McKinnon looked over and signed the 
warrant. 
After the warrant was signed, Officer Mark Lee and I searched the 
trailer. We recovered 19 items. The list is as follows: 
1. A baggie with a razer blade and residue from under the living room 
coffee table. 
2. A white plastic tube with residue from under the living room coffee 
table. 
3. Some green organic material (suspected Marijuana) from the glass top 
of the living room coffee table. 
4. Another white plastic tube with residue inside. It was found on the 
top of the living room coffee table. 
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A. W. Lauritzen 
Attorney at Law/ Attorney for Defendant 
P. O. Box 171 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Telephone: (435) 753-3391 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
COUNTY OF RICH, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
LAURA DABLE 
Defendant, 
FINDINGS AND ORDER 
DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE 
Case No. 00110027 FS 
Judge Judkins 
This matter came on for hearing before the Court on 25 June, 2001 at the hour of 10:00 
A.M. and the Court having been fully briefed on the claims of the parties and having attended to 
argument of counsel having found the pertinent and relevant facts of the case as follows: 
FACTS AS PRESENTED BY THE CASE 
1. In April of 2000 Officer Dale Stacey spoke with a man named Threll Orton after he had 
been arrested by Wyoming authorities and while he was incarcerated in Evanston, Wyoming; the 
arrest was based on a charge of allegedly selling Methamphetamine and Marijuana. Mr. 
Orton informed Officer Stacey that he had gotten the Methamphetamine, which provided the basis 
for the Wyoming charge, from a woman in Randolph named Laura and a description of her 
residence was provided. 
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2. On June 6, 2000, Officer Stacey allegedly was contacted by Deputy Kim Clark from 
the Lincoln County, Wyoming Sheriff's Office. Officer Clark requested that officers in Randolph, 
Utah watch out for a woman named Laura Dable who had a trailer on West Park Street. Officer 
Clark allegedly told Officer Stacey that an informant had told them Defendant was going to 
Ogden to pick up some Marijuana and Methamphetamine to sell in Lincoln County and that he 
felt that they had enough information to make a traffic stop and search the vehicle. Officer Stacey 
stated in a June 14, 2000 report, "We did not see Dable in Randolph that evening", referring to 
June 6, 2000.l 
3. On June 7, 2000, Officer Stacey allegedly received a telephone call from Officer Clark 
stating that Wyoming authorities had arrested Defendant, and that she had in her possession 
approximately 4 ounces of Marijuana and 8 grams of Methamphetamine. It was reported to 
Officer Stacey that Defendant admitted to Officer Kim Clark and Officer Jodie Gardner that she 
had bought the drugs in Ogden, and then stopped at her trailer in Randolph before proceeding to 
Wyoming where she was arrested. 
4. Officer Stacey, relying on the above information, prepared an Affidavits copy of which 
is on file with the Court. Officer Stacey, without assistance from the Rich County Attorney 
presented the Affidavit and a proposed Search Warrant, which warrant is attached 
hereto as Exhibit B. to Judge Ross McKinnon to "look over",at around 6:00 p.m. on June 7, 
2000. 
All of the above data came from the notes of Officer Stacey, provided to Defendant by the Rich County Attorney's 
office pursuant to a Discovery request served by Defendant. 
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5. Judge MdKinnon, accepted the Affidavit as prepared by Officer Dale Stacey without 
noting changes, deletions or additions and based thereon issued a Search Warrant for the trailer of 
Laura Dable at West Park Street in Randolph, Utah, authorizing a search for controlled 
substances, packaging material, or any type of paraphernalia used with illegal controlled 
substances. The search was conducted and was concluded at 22:35 hrs., sunset on June 7th, 2000 
was at 20:59 hours. 
The Court now concludes as a matter of law that: 
6. The Statement and information in the Affidavit attributed to Law Enforcement Officers 
even if said officer or officers were not known to the Affiant need no other verification or other 
indicia of reliability and may be, taken as true by the magistrate simply because the informant 
was a Peace Officer. 
7. The information provided in the Affidavit, without any weight given to it except as 
provided by the Wyoming officers was sufficient, to justify issuance of a Search Warrant given 
the supporting circumstances of this case. 
8. The fact that Defendant was not mirandized prior to her purported statement to 
Wyoming Peace Officers does not require that the Magistrate refuse to consider said statements 
as providing part of the basis for issuance of a warrant or that the Court give less weight to said 
unmirandized statement. 
9. Since the information provided in the Affidavit exclusive of that attributed to Threll 
Orton is sufficient to justify the issuance of a Search Warrant; the omission of certain facts 
surrounding his statement is not material to the evaluation of the Affidavit. 
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10. Since the search commenced during daylight hours, the unsupported direction that 
the Search Warrant could be executed day or night is harmless error. 
11. The fact that the Search Warrant was a form in blank and was incompletely filled 
out is harmless error. 
12. The fact that the Affidavit contained unsupportable allegations, since those facts need 
not necessarily be found in order to support issuance of the Search Warrant, that inaccuracy 
does not bear on the adequacy of the Affidavit. 
Based on the foregoing findings, the Motion to Suppress Evidence Seized pursuant to the 
Search Warrant issued in this case is denied. 
Dated this day of 2001 
District Judge 
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June 2000 
Logan, Utah 
Sunday 
r 
Twi: 5:20am 
Sun Rise: 
5:53am 
Sun Set 8:57pm 1 
[Twi: 9:30pm 
111 
Twi: 5:18am 
Sun Rise: 
5:52am 
Sun Set: 9:01pm 
|Twi: 9:35pm 
18 
Twi: 5:18am 
Sun Rise: 
5:52am 
Sun Set: 9:04pm 
I Twi: 9:38pm 
25 
Twi: 5:19am 
Sun Rise: 
5:53am 
Sun Set: 9:05pm 
| Twi: 9:39pm 
J Monday 
r 
Twi: 5:19am 
Sun Rise: 
5:53am 
Sun Set: 8:57pm 
Twi: 9:31pm 
12 
Twi: 5:18am 
Sun Rise: 
5:52am 
Sun Set: 9:01pm 
Twi: 9:35pm 
19 
Twi: 5:18am 
Sun Rise: 
5:52am 
Sun Set: 9:04pm 
Twi: 9:38pm 
26 
Twi: 5:20am 
Sun Rise: 
5:54am 
Sun Set: 9:05pm 
Twi: 9:39pm 
Tuesday 
r 
Twi: 5:19am 
I Sun Rise: 
5:53am 
Sun Set: 8:58pm 
Twi: 9:32pm 
13 
Twi: 5:17am 
Sun Rise: 
5:52am 
Sun Set 9:02pm 
Twi: 9:36pm 
20 
Twi: 5:18am 
Sun Rise: 
5:52am 
Sun Set 9:04pm 
Twi: 9:39pm 
27 
Twi: 5:20am 
Sun Rise: 
5:54am 
Sun Set: 9:05pm 
Twi: 9:39pm 
I Wednesday 
r 
Twi: 5:19am 
Sun Rise: 5:52am 
Sun Set: 8:59pm 
Twi: 9:32pm 
14 
Twi: 5:17am 
Sun Rise: 5:52am 
Sun Set: 9:02pm 
Twi: 9:36pm 
21 
Twi: 5:18am 
Sun Rise: 5:52am 
Sun Set 9:05pm 
Twi: 9:39pm 
28 
Twi: 5:20am 
Sun Rise: 5:54am 
Sun Set: 9:05pm 
Twi: 9:39pm 
J Thursday 
hT 
Twi: 5:21am 
Sun Rise: 
5:55am 
Sun Set: 8:54pm 
[Twi: 9:28pm 
r 
Twi: 5:18am 
Sun Rise: 
5:52am 
Sun Set 8:59pm 
Twi: 9:33pm 
15 
Twi: 5:17am 
Sun Rise: 
5:52am 
Sun Set: 9:03pm 
Twi: 9:37pm 
22 
Twi: 5:18am 
Sun Rise: 
5:52am 
Sun Set 9:05pm 
Twi: 9:39pm 
29 
Twi: 5:21am 
Sun Rise 
5:55am 
Sun Set: 9:05pm 
Twi: 9:39pm 
Friday 
r 
Twi: 5:21am 
Sun Rise: 
5:54am 
Sun Set: 8:55pm 
[Twi: 9:29pm 
r 
Twi: 5:18am 
Sun Rise: 
5:52am 
Sun Set: 9:00pm 
Twi: 9:34pm 
16 
Twi: 5:17am 
Sun Rise: 
5:52am 
Sun Set: 9:03pm 
Twi: 9:37pm 
23 
Twi: 5:18am 
Sun Rise: 
5:53am 
Sun Set: 9:05pm 
Twi: 9:39pm 
30 
Twi: 5:21am 
Sun Rise: 
5:55am 
Sun Set: 9:05pm 
Twi: 9:39pm 
Saturday 
r 
Twi: 5:20am 
Sun Rise: 5:54am 
Sun Set: 8:56pm 
Twi: 9:29pm 
10 
Twi: 5:18am 
Sun Rise: 5:52am 
Sun Set: 9:00pm 
Twi: 9:34pm 
17 
Twi: 5:17am 
Sun Rise: 5:52am 
Sun Set: 9:03pm 
Twi: 9:38pm 
24 
Twi: 5:19am 
Sun Rise: 5:53am 
Sun Set: 9:05pm 
Twi: 9:39pm 
DST is in effect for the entire month 
Courtesy of www.sunrisesunset.com 
Address bugs, comments and questions to Steve Edwards at steve@sunrisesunset.com. 
All information presented here is believed correct, but is not guaranteed. 
Read the Definitions & FAQs. Accuracy and Privacy statements. 
Copyright €> 2000 Steve Edwards 
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